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HD3616.C72 2010 Abstract 
 
This paper surveys and analyzes industrial policies in Colombia, finding extensive 
use of productive development policies (PDPs) and despite claims of only 
moderate government intervention. Rarely explicitly associated with the need to 
address market failures, PDPs are instead associated with economic reactivation 
and vaguely defined “competitiveness.” There are also PDPs that address 
government failures considered unlikely to be corrected by first-best 
interventions. Colombia has made progress, however, in structuring an 
institutional setting for PDP design that is sufficiently linked with private sector 
groups to elicit information on constraints and opportunities that require 
government intervention. Nonetheless, the overall set of PDPs in place still lacks 
coherence and is not always guided by the policy requests of the private sector 
more widely defined.  
 
JEL Classifications: L52, L66, L67, L86 





  11. Introduction 
 
Latin American and Caribbean countries’ underperformance relative to other developing 
countries in terms of productivity growth has been reflected in only moderate average economic 
growth of the region over the last 15 years. Colombia is no exception.  
Figure 1 summarizes the history of economic growth in Colombia since 1970. GDP per 
capita grew at an average annual rate of 3 percent in the 1970s and then at 2.2 percent between 
1985 and 1997, but completely stagnated during the first half of the 1980s and decreased at an 
annual rate of -1.3 percent between 1997 and 2002. This poor performance has been partially 
compensated for by positive growth rates since 2003, with average annual growth of GDP per 
capita reaching 3.6 percent between then and 2006. Still, the average annual growth rate of 1990-
2006 is only 1.4 percent.   
 





















































































GDP per worker GDP per capita
 
    Source: DANE and GRECO (2002).  
 
  2  The picture is even less appealing in regard to the evolution of GDP per worker, which 
peaked in 1995 and then fell continuously until 2003. Despite recent recovery, GDP per worker 
had by the end of 2006 only reached its level of 10 years earlier.  
  Underlying these results is stagnant productivity. Medina, Meléndez and Seim (2003) 
measure plant-level TFP between 1978 and 1999 and find aggregate manufacturing productivity 
largely stagnates and even declines in some of the larger industries during this period.  
  Since aggregate productivity is essentially the outcome of decisions made by economic 
and social actors in response to economic policies and the way they are designed and 
implemented, the analysis of existing productive development policies (PDPs) may help 
understanding why social returns to investment are low and identifying possible lines of reform 
for both policies and institutional settings that may help to generate higher productivity.  
  We focus on the Colombian case. We show that in Colombia, use of sector-specific or 
region-specific PDPs as well as of more horizontal incentive policies has been extensive, despite 
the fiction maintained until recently of moderate government intervention. PDPs, with few 
exceptions, have rarely been explicitly associated in speech to market failures; this is particularly 
true for vertical PDPs targeting sectors or particular groups of firms. More commonly, PDPs 
have been associated with economic reactivation and “competitiveness,” a term that until 
recently dominated policymaking jargon and has been used to justify a mixed set of policies tied 
up by loose rationality. There is also a set of PDPs that, in the spirit of “second best” policies, 
address government failures considered unlikely to be corrected by first- best interventions. 
  Colombia has made progress, however, in structuring an institutional setting for PDP 
design that is sufficiently linked with private sector groups to elicit information on constraints 
and opportunities that require government intervention. This has been a process of trial and error 
that started with liberalization in the early 1990s and that, while still lacking in many 
dimensions, is starting to be reflected in new courses of policy action.  This institutional setting 
for PDP design coexists, as we discuss, with another track of policymaking, in which economic 
groups and other private actors obtain their desired policies by entering into transactions with 
bureaucrats and politicians. As a result, the overall set of PDPs in place still lacks coherence and 
is not always guided by the policy requests of the private sector more widely defined. 
  This document is organized as follows. Section 2 contains an analysis of the evolution 
and characterization of the PDP decision-making process in Colombia. Section 3 classifies PDPs 
  3in place according to their degree of transversality and to the channel through which they 
materialize, and discusses the rationales supporting them in light of the best practices economic 
literature. The section uses the records of the Domestic Agenda consultations and the module of 
Fedesarrollo’s Entrepreneurial Opinion Survey (EOS) prepared for the purpose of this study
1 to 
complement this analysis. Sections 4 and 5 present a more detailed analysis of a set of specific 
horizontal and vertical PDPs, and Section 6 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Evolution and Characteristics of PDPs’ Implementation and Institutional 
setting 
 
2.1 A Paradigm Shift after Trade Opening 
 
Colombia, like other Latin American countries, followed an import substitution industrialization 
(ISI) strategy from around 1950 up to 1991, though since 1967 the strategy should be rather 
characterized as a hybrid model that added an active export promotion strategy to ISI. The main 
policy instruments for the execution of the early ISI strategy were trade protectionism, 
subsidized and directed credit and tax exemptions. A host of institutions and additional 
intervention instruments were used to protect and promote agricultural development. From 1967 
onwards export subsidies, credit and marketing support, plus trade agreements to secure market 
access and an expanded ISI strategy through the Andean Community, were added to this list of 
instruments, while tax exemptions were phased out under a commitment to more neutral tax 
policies. Macro policies were also affected by the paradigm shift: Colombia adopted a “crawling 
peg,” instead of the previous commitments to fixed exchange rates, in order to avoid 
undervaluations that discriminated against exports and led to successive currency crises.
2 
Subsidized and directed credit was significantly reduced through a comprehensive financial 
reform in 1974.    
  In 1991 the Gaviria administration drastically eliminated or reduced much of the trade 
protection institutions and instruments, opened the capital account, further reduced subsidized 
and directed credit and many other instruments of support and intervention (notably in 
agriculture) and initiated the privatization of public banks and utilities, in what was broadly 
defined as a new economic model of apertura (opening). The 1991 Constitutional reform 
                                                 
1 Results from these sources are presented in Appendix 1. 
2 See Perry (2008) for an analysis of the motivations and conceptual structure behind these policy changes. 
  4endorsed this new view (though it also retained significant scope for Government intervention), 
considerably decentralized public finances and services provision (a process initiated in 1968), 
gave autonomy to the Central Bank and reinforced the role of Development Plans, which, 
proposed by Government in consultation with civil society, and approved by Congress, would 
constitute a “super” law that gave each Government legal instruments to execute its development 
strategy and its public investment plan—and would afterwards constrain its policies. The new 
Constitution also strengthened human and social rights protection as well as political 
participation channels. 
  As a consequence of this paradigm shift, the conceptual approach to PDPs, as well as its 
instruments and institutions, underwent a significant change. From the previous traditional 
“industrial policies”, geared to promote industrialization mostly through trade protectionism and 
direct support to “strategic” industries –though also keeping significant protection and support to 
agriculture-, a new concern with “competitiveness” and institutions and processes to promote it 
through formal consultation and agreements with the private sector, began to emerge.  
 
2.2 Zigzags in the Development of the Competitiveness and Productivity Agenda and 
Institutions from 1992 to 2006 
 
The Gaviria Administration, through the Institute for Industrial Promotion, contracted seven 
sector-level “competitiveness” studies
3 with the international firm Monitor, composed of 
previous Porter associates. Though these studies did not lead to significant action, their concept 
of competitiveness based on “productive chains” influenced the policy and consultation process 
for more than a decade.  
  The Samper Administration,
4 as soon as inaugurated in 1994, approved a set of policy 
guidelines on competitiveness,
5 instituted a National Council for Competitiveness and began a 
formal process of consultation and agreements with the private sector. The council was a mixed 
body, with representatives from the private sector, labor, academia and government, and reported 
directly to the president.
6 Advisory committees were set up in five transversal areas: firm 
management, productivity and quality; technology; human resources; infrastructure; regulatory 
                                                 
3 For petrochemicals, flowers, leather, textiles, fruit juices, graphic arts and metal mechanics. 
4 Samper had been Minister of Development and Trade in the Gaviria Administration, in charge of the initial process 
of trade opening 
5 Council for Economic and Social Policy, CONPES, Document 2724 
6 The Economic Secretary of the President acted as coordinator. 
  5and legal frameworks. The technical secretariat of each committee was given to specialized 
Government agencies and private sector organizations. Under Council auspices, sector 
Competitiveness Agreements were negotiated in 11 “production chains.”
7 S o m e  o f  t h e s e  
agreements were geared to restructuring needs vis-à-vis increased import competition, while 
others were oriented towards the development of export capabilities. Most of the agreements 
contained concrete action plans, with government commitments in areas of regulation, trade 
policies, financial support and infrastructure, and private sector commitments to certain 
productivity or export goals. However, there was no monitoring of implementation, neither 
evaluation of results, so it is difficult to ascertain their effects. 
  The Pastrana Administration (1998-2002) left the direction of competitiveness policies to 
the Commission for Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The ministry launched a 
new policy of productivity and competitiveness, somewhat more focused on export sectors and 
opportunities, and developed an ambitious 10-year strategic plan for exports. The administration 
additionally reorganized the previous advisory committees into 10 transversal groups, 
corresponding to the 10 competitiveness factors defined by the World Economic Forum, under 
the coordination of the Red Colombia Compite (RCC). The ministry also organized 
public/private regional advisory competitiveness committees (CARCEs) in all departments. Led 
by a technocratic minister, the RCC and some of the CARCEs were very dynamic and generated 
a great deal of enthusiasm in the private sector during the Pastrana Administration. This 
organization survived but languished during the first Uribe Administration (2002-2006). Forty- 
one sector competitiveness agreements were negotiated from 1998 to 2006, mostly during the 
Pastrana Administration, including 31 with national coverage and 10 with regional coverage, 29 
on industrial and agricultural “production chains” and 12 involving service sectors. These 
agreements had only a limited effect on Government policies, however, mostly due to the fact 
that the Trade Ministry was in no position to influence the policies and decisions of other 
ministries, often led by more politically powerful ministers with their own agendas. Other 
weaknesses of the process are discussed in the following section. 
  Even more, the first Uribe Administration established a parallel competing process in 
2004, as a complement to the launching of negotiations of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with 
                                                 
7 Textiles and apparel; leather and leather products; siderurgy, metal mechanics and automobile industries; software; 
pulp, paper and graphic industries; aquiculture; maize, sorghum, cassava, poultry and pork; milk and milk 
derivatives; oleaginous products, oils and fats; and rice. See Flórez and Misas (2008). 
  6the United States: the so called “Domestic Agenda.”
8 This was a broad process of regional, 
sector and transversal consultations led by the National Planning Department (DNP), geared to 
identifying priority policies and investments required to take advantage of export opportunities 
under the future FTA, as well as to mitigate the impact of increased import competition from the 
United States.  Section 3 uses the records of the Domestic agenda to discuss private sector policy 
demands. 
 
2.3 Taking Stock: 2005 and 2006 Assessments of Previous Experiences   
In 2006 the Government requested an international consulting agency to provide a full 
assessment of competitiveness policies and processes for the period 1998-2006. The study 
highlighted four major weaknesses in the overall institutional structure: duplication of efforts and 
consultation activities between Red Colombia Compite and the Domestic Agenda since 2004, a 
low level of activity on transversal and process issues (several of the initial transversal 
committees were inactive by 2006), excessively informal links with key decision-making bodies 
(like CONPES and Congress) and weak participation by entrepreneurs, particularly SMES 
(private sector representation was mostly carried on through business association staff), as well 
as by several key agencies.
9 It also concluded that the major process drawbacks were weak 
execution, followed by weak monitoring of actions and commitments and inadequate impact 
evaluation
10 (see Figure 2). 
 
                                                 
8 Agenda Interna para la Productividad y Competitividad, CONPES 3297 of 2004 
9 Like the FDI promotion agency, Coinvertir, absorbed by Proexport in 2003, and the regulatory and supervisory 
bodies for the financial sector, utilities and social services. However, nearly 160 public agencies were involved in 
these processes. 
10 It also found specific weaknesses in policy formulation in two areas (firm strategies and technology) and 
significant weaknesses in regulation in environmental policies. 















































































































































Planning and budget Execution
Supervision, follow-up and control Result evaluation
Impact evaluation Result and impact evaluation
 
      Source: BOT (2006). 
 
  The diagnosis included an extensive survey of participants. In spite of the institutional 
problems indicated above, participants considered the overall “institutional structure” as fairly 
adequate (an average score of 3.2 over 5) but the overall strategy and process as inadequate 
(scores of 2.5 and 2.4). In particular, participants considered that the country did not have a clear 
and coherent competitiveness strategy and that the Government strategy lacked continuity (score 
2.5); that there was a lack of a shared vision across groups on the competitiveness strategy (score 
2.2), especially on the part of civil society organizations; that processes were weak (score 2.4), 
particularly with respect to execution, monitoring and evaluation; and so were information and 
communications channels (score 2.5).
11 The survey highlighted the capabilities and commitment 
of some government agencies (especially DNP and the Ministry of Trade and its agencies and a 
few departments and municipalities) and private sector organizations, though not of other actors. 
In particular, civil society organizations, academic representatives, the ministry of Agriculture 
and its agencies and most departmental and municipal agencies received low scores on 
capabilities and commitment. 
                                                 
11 The diagnostic report also benchmarked the Colombian process vis-à-vis other countries (Finland, Sweden, Korea, 
Ireland, Malaysia, India, Vietnam, Senegal, Turkey, Latvia, Chile, Brazil and Mexico). It concluded that “successful 
cases” tend to have a simple institutional structure with strong leadership, a focus on firms and synergies between 
different policies and dimensions of competitiveness, strong Presidential backing, high participation in networks, 
accountability mechanisms and continuity. Colombia was found to have a relatively sound institutional structure 
(except for duplications between the RCC and the Domestic Agenda structures, which it urged to be integrated), but 
relatively weak processes, especially in terms of accountability (including M&E) and focus. 
  8 Participants  highlighted  the adequacy of the organization by productive chains and 
horizontal networks, though they were more critical about the regional networks, with some 
exceptions corresponding mostly to the largest Departments and Bogotá. However, another 
technical evaluation of Competitiveness Agreements led by the Corporación Andina de Fomento 
(CAF) in 2005
12 had found “satisfactory” only 5 out of 38 competitiveness agreements by 
productive chains, none of them in the agricultural sector, and none of the horizontal networks 
(see Table 1).  
 
Table 1.  
a.  Evaluation of Sector-Level Competitiveness Agreements 
Grade MCIT MADR
Less than 30  6 5
Between 30 and 60 14 8
Between 60 and 90 5 -
Between 90 and 100 - -  
 








 Human capital 24  
Source: Corporación Calidad and CAF (2005). 
 
  The CAF evaluation of competitiveness agreements included detailed surveys of 
participants and signatories.
13 For this purpose, seven out of 41 agreements were selected as 
representative of different eras and characteristics of sectors, five national and two regional in 
scope.
14 Opinions, especially those from the private sector, were quite negative about the 
effectiveness of the agreements (see Figure 3): 68 percent of private sector respondents believed 
                                                 
12 Evaluation of Competiveness Agreements by Corporación Calidad and CAF, 2005 
13 Participants and signatories do not necessarily coincide. 
14 Flowers; Cotton, Textiles and Apparel; Footwear and Leather products; Electronics (regional); Housing cluster 
(regional);  Software; Logistics and Transport. 
  9that the agreements did not provide an adequate base for their respective productive chain’s 
development. Several operational traits additionally received poor marks, again especially from 
private sector representatives: insufficient coverage of key topics, poor communications, and a 
low level of participation by Government officials with decision-making power. Public sector 
officials, in turn, perceived weak participation and commitment from entrepreneurs, who were 
represented primarily through business associations. In addition, most participants emphasized 
the need to establish quantifiable objectives and monitoring and evaluation systems. In spite of 
this rather negative assessment, there was general support for the objectives of the agreements 
and for the need of such mechanisms for public/private interaction. As a consequence, the key 
recommendations of this study were to appoint managers for each agreement, with own 
budgetary resources, and to establish quantifiable objectives and monitoring and evaluation 
systems to guarantee continuity and efficacy. 
 


















































































































































































































































               Source: CAF (2005). 
 
 
2.4 The Development of an Integrated National Competitiveness System from 2006 Onwards 
 
On the basis of these two diagnostics, the Government reorganized the institutional setup and 
redefined the strategy.
15 A well thought out institutional structure evolved. First, it is a unified 
structure, coordinated by a national commission for competitiveness (CNC) made up of a 
balanced representation of public and private key interests,
16 with a public/private operational 
executive committee,
17 a governmental operational committee and a public/private technical 
                                                 
15 CONPES (2006) Institucionalidad y principios rectores de política para la Competitividad y Productividad, Policy 
Document 3439. According to the recommendations of the two diagnostics, the strategy was to be based on 
focalization of priorities; precise goals and clear evaluation and accountability mechanisms; strong participation of 
the private sector and co-responsibility with governmental agencies; emphasis on SMEs and development of 
regional institutions and capabilities in lagging areas. 
16 Eight ministers, the directors of the science and technology agency (Colciencias) and the national training institute 
(SENA), the presidents of the national federations of Departments and Municipalities, two private sector 
representatives selected by the federation of business associations, two trade union representatives, the president of 
the association of universities, and a representative of regional universities and three independent members selected 
by the president. 
17 Composed of the Presidential Advisor for Competitiveness and Productivity, the Minister of Trade and Industry, 
the Head of DNP and the President of the Private Council for Competitiveness. Vice Ministers and Heads of key 
Government Agencies. 
  11secretariat.
18 The CNC established 14 horizontal and 10 vertical technical working groups.
19 
Second, unified public/private regional commissions, merging existing ones, were established 
under the coordination of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Federation of Trade 
Chambers (Confecámaras).  Third, a monitoring and evaluation system was designed and is 
being operated by DNP, with results publicly available through a governmental webpage 
(SIGOB).   
  The CNC formulated, and CONPES approved in June 2008,
20 a new Competitiveness and 
Productivity Strategy. The strategy adopted as a basic principle that the competitiveness agenda 
would be based on productivity increases and not on reduction of labor costs or rent- seeking 
activities. It also envisaged a State role based on the provision of public goods as key inputs to 
increase the competitiveness and productivity of the private sector and the promotion of 
public/private alliances and regional competitiveness dimensions. The main goals would be to 
guarantee that “by 2032 Colombia is one of the three most competitive Latin American 
countries”; to achieve a level of income per capita corresponding to a high middle-income 
country through an economy exporting goods and services with high value added and 
technological content and a strong investment climate; and to promote internal regional 
convergence, increased formal employment and sharply reduced poverty levels. It was further 
noted that productivity increases would have to come mostly by the development of new 
products and exports. The latter was a conclusion derived from a Hausmann and Klinger study
21 
for the Private Council for Competitiveness. 
  The new strategy adopted detailed action plans for each of its working groups, with 
precise products, activities, indicators, goals and responsible Agencies, indicating progress to 
that date on each of them. The most interesting development to date relates to the Action Plan on 
developing World Class Sectors, which is discussed in Section 5 below. The SIGOB gives 
permanently updated information on the development of these Action Plans, as well as on other 
Government programs.  
                                                 
18 Composed of the Presidential Advisor for Competitiveness and Productivity, the Vice Minister of Trade and 
Industry for Entrepreneurship Development, a delegate of DNP and two Vice Presidents of the Private Council for 
Competitiveness. 
19 See Appendix 2.  
20 CONPES, Policy Document 3527 (2008).  
21 Hausmann and Klinger (2007). 
  12  We should highlight the influence of external advisors (from Porter to Hausmann) and 
institutions (WEF, World Bank, IADB, CAF and USAID) on these developments. In particular, 
the CNC and CONPES have adopted as explicit goals to improve Colombia’s score in the WEF 
Competitiveness Indexes and the World Bank Doing Business Reports. The Ministry of Trade 
has officials responsible for each set of indicators, who promote agreements among the relevant 
government units and monitor their implementation. All major cities have prepared action plans 
based on a sub-national report on Doing Business financed by the WB and USAID. Not 
surprisingly, Colombia has won twice in a row the “prize” of major reformer according to the 
CDB indicators. Such a strong drive towards achieving improvements in these external 
indicators stimulates activism and compliance and facilitates monitoring and evaluation, but it 
can also bias efforts towards low-cost actions that may not yield the greatest benefits. Indeed, 
there is no way to know at present the actual benefits on TFP increases of a given improvement 
in one or another of the individual WEF or CDB indexes.  
 
2.5. Two Promising Initiatives 
 
2.5.1  The Private Council for Competitiveness  
 
The creation of a Private Council for Competitiveness in January 2007 signaled an increased 
degree of commitment by the private sector to the Competitiveness Agenda and could make an 
important difference going forward in terms of effectiveness and continuity of the PDP process. 
The Council includes both business associations and selected successful entrepreneurs, 
committed to the concept that firm productivity is the key to competitiveness and growth, that 
the State has a purely facilitating role, providing both general and sector-specific public goods, 
and that public/private alliances are needed to identify and support successful “bets” and 
emerging clusters, solve coordination problems and overcome bottlenecks. It has close ties to the 
US Competitiveness Council, which has been its inspiration, and has had Ricardo Hausmann as 
its main advisor.
22  
  As part of CNC technical secretariat the Council was very active in the design of the new 
Competitiveness Strategy approved by CONPES and is pushing its development. It publishes an 
excellent Annual Report on Competitiveness,
23 which gives an updated diagnosis of national, 
                                                 
22 Regional “product maps”, following Hausmann’s “open forests” concepts, have been produced to guide selection 
of growth areas. The potential usefulness of these exercises is still to be established. 
23 The second report was launched in November 5, 2008. 
  13sectoral and regional competitiveness issues and highlights advances and problems in the 
implementation of the agenda. Its current own initiatives are focused on logistics, informality, 
tax structure and intellectual property rights. It is also supporting important initiatives such as the 
establishment of a Labor Observatory, with the Ministry of Education, and an ambitious ITC 
plan under implementation by the Ministry of Communications. The Council has given public 
prominence and support to a modern competitiveness agenda, provides a non-official monitoring 
and evaluating channel and can potentially help to maintain continuity of the strategy. 
  
2.5.2  Business Plans for World Class Sectors 
 
The Ministry of Industry and Trade, with the advice of the consulting firm McKinsey, identified 
a set of potential emerging world-class sectors for Colombia through a methodology (based on 
those followed by China, Korea, Dubai, Kuwait, Spain and Ireland) that contrasted global 
opportunities
24 with Colombian relative strengths (sectors with strong local development and/or 
potential for growth, significant actual export performance and competitive advantages) and 
weaknesses, according to a host of previous studies.
25 A preliminary group of emerging sub-
sectors with strong export growth potential was identified for which a more detailed analysis of 
potential markets and entry barriers was undertaken. As a result, a “short list” of seven sectors 
was selected: business process outsourcing, software and IT services, health tourism, cosmetics, 
household appliances, auto parts and pharmaceuticals. 
  After an open call to these sectors for “sector-level value proposals,” to which six sectors 
responded, the best two were selected. Detailed Business Plans were elaborated for these two 
sectors (business process outsourcing and software and IT services), financed by the Ministry of 
Trade, with support of McKinsey and high industry participation, which were finalized and 
approved in August 2008. The Business Plans are based on a detailed identification and 
projection of global and regional market opportunities, benchmarking of Colombian strengths 
and weaknesses vis-à-vis potential competitors, establishment of goals and an action plan. To 
take as an example business process outsourcing, 31 required action initiatives were identified, 
of which 12 were related to skill upgrading, 9 to the regulatory framework, 8 to industry 
maturing, and 2 to infrastructure improvements. It is estimated that the implementation of this 
                                                 
24 Sectors with high global and regional growth; analysis of strengths and weaknesses of competitors; and 
identification of key success factors.  
25 Porter, Haussman, IDI, Domestic Agenda, Araujo Ibarra, AT Kearney, Universidad del Valle, Colciencias. 
  14plan may generate around US$1.4 billion in additional exports (out of US$3.3 billion in   
additional total sales) and 78,000 new jobs by 2012. Chapter V of this report discusses the 
Software Business Plan. From a second call for “sector-level value proposals” two additional 
emerging export “growth” sectors were selected: health tourism and cosmetics, for which 
Business Plans are being produced follo wing the same methodology.  
  This program for emerging export “growth” sectors is being complemented by a similar 
call for proposals to mature sectors with export growth potential. Following a similar 
methodology, 11 mature sectors with significant export growth potential through innovation and 
development of new products were invited through their respective business associations to 
present “sector value proposals”: graphic industries, energy power, siderurgy and metal 
mechanics, jewelry, textiles and apparel, footwear and leather products, petrochemicals and 
plastics, fertilizers and pesticides, auto parts,
26 biotechnology and industrial and health gases. 
Seven of these sectors presented proposals that are presently under evaluation. In the case of 
mature sectors, the Ministry will finance only half of the cost of the elaboration of the Business 
Plan. A second round for a similar call for proposals in agricultural and agroindustrial sectors is 
being prepared jointly with the Ministry of Agriculture.  
  The program was officially launched in October 2008 under the generic name of 
“Productive Transformation.” The Ministry emphasized in the presentation the differences with 
traditional industrial policies, specially the fact that it is a competitive program (without arbitrary 
selection of winners), as eventually the elaboration of Business Plans can be done jointly with 
any sector that presents a sound “value proposal” and that no subsidies or differential tariffs or 
taxes are offered. The program has been well received, but it is still too early to be able to predict 
results or even continuity under the next administration.
27 
 
2.6 But Bad Habits Die Hard: The Survival of a Parallel Track 
We described above the evolution of a process of policy experimentation and institutional 
construction for a modern PDP strategy since trade opening in the early 1990s. Although this 
process has been fraught with inconsistencies, weaknesses and lack of continuity, it appears to be 
maturing and consolidating into a participative, integrated and operative institutional structure 
and strategy, which is producing promising initiatives like the pilot Business Plans to achieve 
                                                 
26 This was the second call for this sector. 
27 Source: Discussions with Minister Luis Guillermo Plata and his team. 
  15World Class Sectors discussed in the last section. However, rent-seeking is alive and well   
through parallel traditional tracks, and there are still major questions regarding the extent to 
which the new process of formulating PDPs actually leads to policy decisions and constraints 
traditional non-transparent policymaking, and even questions about the continuity of the present 
institutional setup and policies. 
  Indeed, though the World Class Sectors strategy emphasizes that subsidies and 
differential tax rates are not options to be considered within the process, there has been a 
proliferation of both subsidies and tax incentives within the present administration. The 
introduction of new tax incentives started timidly during the first Uribe Administration, 
benefiting a few handpicked emerging “growth” sectors in 2003, such as biofuels (which are 
further discussed in Section 5) and tourism. In 2004, a generous temporary income tax reduction 
for investments was established, financed by retained profits and with the stated purpose of 
stimulating investment. This decision was accompanied by a major public discussion in which 
many expert voices pointed out that an incipient investment boom was already underway, fueled 
by a favorable external environment and significant improvements in public order, so that an 
additional stimulus was unnecessary and rather imprudent given the existing high central 
government deficit and public debt levels.
28 In 2006, the Minister of Finance presented to 
Congress a bold tax reform proposal that would eliminate most tax incentives and at the same 
time significantly reduce the corporate tax rate, which was one of the highest in Latin America. 
The general direction of this proposal received significant support from academia and the 
media.
29 However, to virtually everyone’s surprise the President began to offer not only to keep 
most existing tax incentives, but also to introduce new ones, during his interventions in sector 
business gatherings. The tax reform approved was almost the opposite of the initial draft: an even 
higher tax reduction for investments financed by retained profits became a permanent feature of 
the tax system and several new exemptions were introduced, much to the regret of the Minister 
of Finance who, when leaving office, openly criticized the tax reform and said this had been his 
greatest disappointment. Indeed, since then, tax incentives are openly promoted and defended by 
                                                 
28 See, for example, Fedesarrollo’s Tendencia Económica, several numbers. The President consulted the opinion of a 
group of Ex Ministers of Finance, which was overwhelmingly negative to the proposal. 
29 Though there was some opposition to an initial proposal to convert the Corporate income tax into a cash flow tax 
(permitting full expense of investments and eliminating depreciation allowances and interest deductions and, 
especially, to a subsequent “hybrid” proposal among these two types of taxes, which would have produced negative 
marginal investment tax rates. 
  16the President as a key instrument for increased investment and growth and as an essential 
component of his government’s economic policy.  
  Similarly, in 2007 the government enacted a new regime for Free Trade Zones, through 
two successive decrees
30 based on Law 1005 of December of 2005.  Law 1005 permitted the 
Government to comply with WTO mandates by converting them to general-purpose free trade 
zones in which firms would be able to import capital goods and inputs free of taxes (tariffs and 
VAT) and be subject to a reduced corporate income tax rate of 15 percent (less than half the full 
rate of 33 percent). The decrees extended these privileges not just to existing export promotion 
zones, but also to a wide variety of permanent or temporary zones, including ports, mining zones 
and individual projects located anywhere, as long as they exceed minimum investment or 
employment levels. Even existing firms can be converted to an FTZ if they undertake a 
significant expansion. The decrees were “negotiated” to make sure that particular investment 
projects fitted the conditions. In practice, the new FTZ regime is essentially a mechanism to 
grant tax incentives to large firms in a more or less discretionary way.
31 The number of FTZs has 
grown from 11 (see Section 4) to an approved total of 38 (see Table 2).  
  Entrepreneurs claimed in our interviews with them that these tax incentives do not affect 
in a significant way their long-term “business plan” (expansions and product diversification). 
They, of course, admit that they are a welcome addition to their cash flows and that, on occasion, 
they influence the choice of technology (by allowing them to choose the most expensive, 
presumably capital-intensive, technology). Furthermore, authorities and beneficiaries are aware 
that the regime is creating major tax discrimination among competing firms and that the situation 
will be untenable in the future, requiring a unification of tax regimes. Because of this, all firms 
benefiting from the new regime have entered into tax stability agreements with the government, 
which will force the future unification to happen at the reduced rate of 15 percent independently 
of actual fiscal needs.  Finally, as the tax reduction for new investments and the new FTZ regime 
evolved independently, neither the government nor Congress realized they would be cumulative, 
leading to several instances of negative marginal rates. This unexpected result is so preposterous 
                                                 
30 Decrees 383 of February and 4051 of October 2007. 
31 Economía y Politica 34, Fedesarrollo, 2008.  
  17that the Government has included in a recent draft law an article prohibiting the accumulation of 
those benefits.
32  
  As a further example, several agricultural lobbies fiercely opposed granting tariff 
reductions under an FTA with the United States. In spite of President Uribe’s considerable 
interest in negotiating such a treaty, the government attempted to either exclude or obtain long 
periods for tariff reductions in several so called “sensitive” agricultural sectors, to the extent that 
this position significantly delayed final agreements until after Congressional elections in the 
United States and thus contributed to present difficulties in obtaining approval in the U.S. 
Congress. In the end, the government attempted to obtain support from agricultural lobbies by 
promising considerable subsidies through a law called “Agro Ingreso Seguro” (secure income for 
agricultural producers) to partially or wholly compensate for potential adverse effects of the FTA 
on those sectors. Ironically, while the treaty has not come into effect and its prospects are rather 
dim, the “compensation” is flowing generously without clear or transparent criteria. Some 
evaluations of the programs financed through this law are underway, but they are unfortunately 
not available at the time of writing.  
 
Table 2. Investments Benefiting from Tax Reductions under the New FTA Regime 
 
 
  Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade. 
                                                 
32 Economía y Política. No. 34. Fedesarrollo. Bogotá, 2008. 
  18It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt an assessment of these interventions. 
General expert opinion, even among Government officials—as revealed during the interviews we 
conducted—is that the allocation of these subsidies represents rent-seeking on a large scale. As 
an example, in 2006 the Government decided in 2006 to revive subsidies to exports
33 in order to 
“compensate” for the effects of currency appreciation on selected sectors. Criteria for selecting 
sectors or fixing the level of the exchange rate over which compensation would take place or 
amounts involved (4 percent of value of exports) were non-transparent and seemingly arbitrary. 
The second Competitiveness Report recently launched by the Private Council for 
Competitiveness highlighted that most of the Agro Ingreso Seguro resources are being used to 
subsidize credit and hedges (55.7 percent and 8.5, respectively) and to grant direct subsidies and 
“compensations” (22.8 percent) to specific sub-sectors. The Council’s view is that large and 
middle-sized producers could access commercial credit and derivative markets without subsidies 
and that the contribution of occasional direct subsidies and compensations to productivity is 
highly suspect.
34 It implicitly suggests that the latter should be eliminated and the former focused 
on small producers, and more resources devoted to “public goods” such as R&D and extension 
services and phytosanitary campaigns.  
As a final example, the annual budget is Constitutionally mandated to conform to a four-
year investment plan approved by Congress as part of the National Development Plan at the 
beginning of each Presidential term. The draft of these laws is prepared by the DNP, which was 
in charge of the Domestic Agenda consultations. Not surprisingly, DNP did its best to reflect the 
outcome of those consultations in the Investment Plan for 2006-2010. However, there is little 
evidence that annual budget drafts and approvals actually reflect the Domestic Agenda’s 
priorities.  
As a case in point, as the Domestic Agenda consultations highlighted major transport 
infrastructure needs, the Planning Department and the private Council for Competitiveness 
followed up in identifying a set of priority infrastructure projects called “the national roads for 
competitiveness.” However, neither annual budgets nor transport policies have given high 
priority to these roads or other primary roads, at least until recently, as continuously criticized by 
the “Cámara de Infraestructura” and brought out clearly by our interviews with all actors in the 
                                                 
33 That had been previously dismantled to comply with WTO mandates and as a consequence of the 1999 fiscal 
crises. 
34 Private Council for Competitiveness (2008).  
  19PDP consultation process. Instead, the Ministry of Transport and the budget have given higher 
priority to an ambitious “Plan 2500” that attempts to build 2500 kilometers of secondary and 
tertiary roads (which should be carried on by Departments and Municipalities) in a short period 
of time. It is widely believed that Plan 2500 is, if anything, the currency with which regional and 
Congressional support was bought for the reelection of President Uribe for the 2006-2010 term. 
Plan 2500 also lends itself to a large number of small contracts to local contractors that play an 
important role in local electoral financing. Thus, traditional clientelistic politics and rent-seeking 
seem behind the partial displacement of “roads for competitiveness” for “roads for 
governability.” The strength of these clientelistic, rent-seeking, parallel tracks is probably a 
reflection of the general clientelistic nature of party politics in Colombia. (It is however beyond 
the scope of this study to explore this or other hypothesis behind this fact.) 
Conversely, even if the proposals from CNC have been approved through CONPES 3527 
and other policy documents, many participants in the process are somewhat skeptical that such 
approvals will necessarily translate into full execution and, thus, into actual Government 
priorities. In interviews conducted, some participants indicated how some key specific actions 
agreed upon through sector-level Competitiveness Agreements were repeatedly “approved” 
through CONPES documents during the last three Governments until they were finally 
executed.
35 As indicated above, evaluations conducted in 2006 found that “execution” was the 
weakest chain in the competitiveness agenda process.  
It may be that the new trend towards precise and dated actions and goals and public 
monitoring through SIGOB may improve actual compliance with CONPES-approved 
agreements, but this remains to be seen. The same is true for those actions agreed upon in the 
World Class Action Plans under the Ministry of Trade and Industry that must be executed by 
other ministries. As mentioned above, this was a major problem for the Competitiveness 
Agreements signed from 1998 to 2002 under the leadership of the former Ministry of Trade. 
Though the current Ministry seems to have received commitments of support from two key 
ministries for the first two pilots (Education and Communications, which are currently led by 
technocratic ministers), participants in the interviews were skeptical about the potential 
cooperation of other ministries, notably Transportation.  
                                                 
35 This was the case, for example, of an expansion and upgrade of the Cartagena refinery, which was deemed 
essential for further development of the petrochemical industry. 
  20All in all, the “new” participative PDP process still appears to be of only marginal 
importance, as compared to the amount of resources, financial and human, deployed through the 
traditional clientelistic track. It might be that it is precisely for this reason that the current PDP 
“process” appears relatively uncontaminated by rent seeking: there are enough opportunities 
elsewhere to benefit from pork. However, this condition of relative “marginality” also makes it 
frail. Indeed, the other major concern is about continuity of policies. The account in this section 
shows how competitiveness policies and institutional structure have been subject to major 
changes every time a new government takes over. It is thus by no means clear that the current 
structure and approach will prevail in a future government. Even a change of Minister of Trade 
(or of presently key allies such as the Ministers of Education and Communications) could 
considerably weaken the process, as happened with the previous Red Colombia Compite. It 
could be that the presence of an organized and committed Private Council for Competitiveness 
this time makes a difference. Admittedly, if current policies can show some important successes, 
well-documented and evaluated, chances of continuity will increase. However, the jury is again 
still out in this regard. 
  
2.7 Assessment of Private Participation in Policymaking 
 
Tables 3-5 summarize the answers of firms to the module on PDPs included in Fedesarrollo’s 
Entrepreneurial Opinion Survey (EOS) in October 2008 for the purpose of this study about their 
participation in the policymaking processes and their evaluation of the qualities of such 
processes.
36 As shown in Table 3, 30 percent of firms acknowledge having had some 
participation in these processes. The corresponding figures for large, medium and small firms are 
38 percent, 16 percent, and 29 percent, respectively. It is surprising that small firms claim much 
higher participation levels than medium-size firms, but such a trait is corroborated by other 
answers to the questionnaire. Participation seems to have increased considerably in the present 
decade, especially among small firms. 
Most firms that have participated in PDP policy making have done so in the context of 
business associations’ initiatives (16 percent of total firms), and only 12 percent of responding 
firms have participated in government-sponsored scenarios (5 percent in the Domestic Agenda 
consultations, 4 percent in negotiations of Competitiveness Agreements, 2 percent in Communal 
                                                 
36Appendix 1 contains a description of the survey and presents a more complete version of these results. 
  21Councils and 1 percent in National Development Plans consultations). Small firms claim more 
participation than medium size firms through most channels, especially through Domestic 
Agenda consultations and Communal Councils—where their participation rates exceed even 
those of large enterprises—with the exception of negotiations of Competitiveness Agreements, 
which seemed limited to large and medium-size firms. 
  Given these results, it is not surprising that very few firms rate participation mechanisms 
as adequate (3 percent out of the 30 percent that participated), especially among small and 
medium- size firms. Most firms claim that channels are essentially limited to firms represented 
by a powerful business association (11 percent out of the 30 percent that participated), to large 
firms (6 percent) or to groups with regional political power (6 percent). In fact, out of the 30 
percent that participated, 4 percent claim that there are no effective implementation mechanisms. 
 
Table 3. Participation in PDP Policymaking 
(percentage of total firms in each category) 
 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
30 70 38 63 16 84 29 71
If affirmative:
Participated before 1991
Participated in the 90's
Has participated in the present decade
Participation in the context of:
Negotiations of Competitiveness 
Agreements
Discussion of Domestic Agenda






Adequate because the government 
provides sufficient spaces for 
participation
Only for firms represented by a 
business association
Only for large firms
Only for groups with political power 
in the regions
Not working due to lack of 















14 20 3 9
11 18 3 0
Total Large Medium Small
Participation in the formulation of 
policies
 
        Source: Fedesarrollo EOS October 2008. 
  22  Table 4 shows a breakdown by main interlocutors. As observed, lobbying in Congress is 
quite common to all firms (around 18 percent of total). It is therefore surprising that the President 
has been the direct interlocutor in half of the cases in which firms have met with executive 
officials. Firms claim much higher effectiveness of interactions with the President than with 
other interlocutors. Large enterprises, as expected, use more varied channels than other firms 
(including technical public officials, as well as professional lobbyists and “other channels”). 
These “other channels” are also reputed to be highly efficient in obtaining desired results. 
 
Table 4. Participation in PDP Policymaking by Main Interlocutor 
(percentage of total firms in each category) 
 
  Total Large Medium Small
One or more congressmen 18 21 12 19
The President 5 7 2 5
A Minister or Vice-minister 3 4 2 5
Other public officials 2 4 0 0
No response 2 3 0 0  
 
 
    Source: Fedesarrollo EOS October 2008. 
 




















One or more congressmen 25 25 25 25
The President of Colombia 39 50 11 0
A Minister or Vice Minister  20 29 34 17
Other public officials 23 15 15 46
Other channel 38 25 25 13  
    Source: Fedesarrollo EOS October 2008. 
 
 
In conclusion, firms’ participation in PDP decision-making processes appear to have 
increased substantially in the present decade, especially for small firms, thanks to the broad 
Domestic Agenda consultation process and frequent Communal Council meetings presided by 
the President himself. Business association initiatives (such as annual assemblies and public 
specialized events, where the President and high public officials usually attend, and organized 
private meetings with authorities), however, continue to be the main individual channel of 
participation. Large firms use a wider variety of participation channels, including hiring 
  23professional lobbyists, “influential” persons and direct lobbying. Thus, in spite of increased 
participation rates, most firms, specially small and medium-sized ones, feel that government- 
sponsored channels are still inadequate, as they are open mostly for large firms, powerful 
business associations or groups with local political power. These conclusions were broadly 
supported in our direct interviews.   
  
3. Analysis of the Current PDP System 
 
3.1 Theoretical Background 
The theoretical justification for industrial policy is not a settled question. The standard notion is 
that governments intervene to alter the structure of production towards sectors with greater 
prospects, to attain growth levels that would not be attained, in the absence of intervention, by a 
typical process of industrial evolution. There is a considerable amount of literature on industrial 
policy, with divergent views. Part of it explores the empirical relevance of market failures that 
would justify industrial policy, while another part debates if government failures from lack of 
information and badly aligned incentives make it impractical to engage in industrial policy even 
in the presence of such failures. 
Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2008) argue that the standard model of industrial policies 
is not always useful as a guide for policy in less developed countries. When there is a latent or 
dynamic comparative advantage associated with local externalities that increase with the size of 
the industry
37 and there is a specific coordination failure preventing it from being exploited, 
temporary protection (or a direct subsidy) may turn that latent comparative advantage into an 
effective one. This is the case for infant-industry protection. Such a policy can be welfare- 
enhancing if the discounted future benefits compensate for the present costs of protection (or if 
the less stringent condition is met that the protected sector can eventually survive international 
competition without protection). In absence of a latent comparative advantage, industrial policies 
aimed at sectors likely to have Marshallian externalities can still be justified, under the condition 
that there are rents associated with the advanced sector, or that there are inter-industry 
externalities such that having a large advanced sector increases overall productivity. 
                                                 
37 Marshallian externalities arising through localized industry-level knowledge spillovers, input-output linkages 
together with transportation costs and labor pooling. 
  24But agglomeration effects may depend on the way production is carried out, and 
externalities may not be intrinsic to sectors but to the way in which they are organized. In this 
case, output reallocation across sectors is not enough for productivity enhancement. When there 
are coordination failures that do not disappear as a sector becomes large, protection and subsidies 
fail, and policies of collective action are called for. In this context, sectors that merit special 
consideration for PDPs would be “ones that have large opportunities for productivity-enhancing 
collective action, or that have high world demand relative to the combined size of countries that 
have achieved such collective action,” and the appropriate policy interventions are focused not 
on the sector or industry itself, but on the activity or technology that produces the characteristics 
of the coordination failure. This holds true even if the ultimate target is a particular sector. 
Also, since diversification of the productive structure is a way of increasing productivity, 
policies to encourage discovery (and through it, diversification) are desirable. Hausmann and 
Rodrik (2003) argue that countries do not know their cost structure, so they do not know the 
goods in which they have a comparative advantage, and this must be discovered through costly 
experimentation. Because this is plagued by information externalities, it has social benefits 
higher than the private benefits it generates, so the market by itself leads to sub-optimal levels of 
discovery and diversification. Policy interventions once more should target activities rather than 
sectors per se. 
Rodrik (2004) emphasizes that the task of industrial policy is as much about eliciting 
information from the private sector on significant externalities and their remedies as it is about 
implementing appropriate policies. Identifying the appropriate policy outputs depends on the 
opportunities and constraints that are identified through a deliberative process in each particular 
case. Design principles for adequate industrial policy include, however, providing incentives 
only to new activities (i.e., products that are new to the local economy or new technologies for 
producing existing products); having clear criteria for success and failure of promotion efforts so 
that failures do not become entrenched; including built-in sunset clauses; targeting activities 
rather than sectors; and ensuring subsidized activities have a clear potential for spillovers. 
Finally, there are government failures and institutional shortcomings that are often a 
fundamental stumbling block and can be major constraints on economic growth. While direct 
action to solve them would be the first best route, there are often political economy constraints 
  25that make that difficult. When this is the case, “second best” compensatory interventions in their 
place are preferable to doing nothing. 
This literature provides elements useful for analyzing the quality of PDPs in Colombia 
from the point of view of their design and the rationales that support them that are used in the 
following chapters in the analysis of specific policies. This chapter starts by characterizing the 
Colombian PDP system according to the degree of transversality of policies and programs and to 
the shape in which they materialize (as public goods or as direct market interventions), and 
investigates to what extent PDPs available are perceived by the private sector as addressing 
actual market failures or other restrictions to investment. 
 
Figure 4 below presents a classification of PDPs in place according to their degree of 
transversality and to the shape in which they materialize (as public goods or as direct market 
interventions). 
 
Figure 4. PDP Classification Matrix 
 
Horizontal Vertical
Business plans for selected sectors.
Services provided by sector specific  public-private 
funds partially financed by compulsory contributions 
from producer (agricultural sectors).
Tariff exemption for imported machinery Income tax exemptions for selected sectors
VAT exemption for imported machinery Tariffs
VAT exemption for industrial machinery VAT exemption for industrial machinery
Deducibility of fixed assets investments from taxable 
income
Band tariff system for selected agricultural crops and 
agroindustrial sectors.
Price support schemes to selected agricultural and 
agroindustrial sectors
Subsidized financing to SMEs Direct subsidies to investments in agriculture.
Cofinancing of business startup projects and of 
technological innovation projects to SMEs
Direct compensation for exchange rate fluctuations to 
selected exporting sectors.
Facilitation of access to credit through guarantee 
system
Professional and technical training (sector specific)
Business plans for selected sectors.
Export promotion policies.
Financial support for R&D projects and R&D training 
(sector specific)
Financial support for R&D projects and R&D 
training.









  26Some items appear in more than one quadrant. This is the case, for instance, of professional and 
technical training offered through SENA (the Spanish acronym for Colombia’s worker training 
institute) to workers without distinguishing among sectors of employment, and training also 
offered through SENA to workers of selected sectors. These types of training differ to the extent 
that the former is intended to strengthen work skills that are common to different types of labor 
and will eventually allow workers to reallocate across productive sectors (e.g., learning English) 
while the latter is intended to provide sector-specific skills (e.g., particularities of cotton). We 
consider this item belongs in both quadrants since, depending on the form it takes, the market 
failures it addresses and the incentives it provides are not the same. For similar reasons, financial 
support for R&D activities also appears in more than one quadrant. While Colciencias allocates 
resources for R&D across sectors, usually through competitive processes, on occasion it also 
targets specific sector-specific R&D developments. Moreover, there are institutions that channel 
R&D resources to specific sectors, like Corpoica, created to promote R&D in agriculture. 
We have also classified Business Plans for selected sectors in both the public input and 
market intervention quadrants of sector-specific PDPs. As mentioned above, these are new 
instruments developed jointly by the Ministry of Industry and Trade and sector representatives at 
the request of the private sector, intended to develop a long-run strategy for the sector and to 
commit both public and private actors to actions directed towards obtaining specific objectives. 
So far, Business Plans for the Software and Business Process Outsourcing sectors have been 
developed, and Business Plans for the Cosmetics and Medical Tourism sectors are underway. All 
actions agreed upon in these plans are sector-specific and in some cases include direct provision 
of public inputs.  
 
3.2 Perceived Market Failures and Other Restrictions on Investment 
 
In this subsection we explore private sector views on the most widely perceived restrictions on 
investment and the adequacy of the policies available to solve them, using two sources of 
information: a database containing the record of the interaction of government authorities and 
private sector representatives in the context of the Domestic Agenda for Productivity and 
Competitiveness,
38 and the results of a special module of Fedesarrollo’s Entrepreneurial Opinion 
                                                 
38 The database of the Domestic Agenda was available from the National Planning Department (DNP). The research 
team coded needs and policy requests for the purpose of this study. 
  27Survey (EOS) on PDPs, prepared for this study. Appendix 1 describes these data sources more 
thoroughly and presents summary tables of their results.   
 
3.2.1 Domestic Agenda 
 
The Domestic Agenda for Productivity and Competitiveness was created in 2004, under 
coordination of the National Planning Department, with the purpose of defining short-run and 
medium-run plans, programs and projects to “take advantage of the opportunities and mitigate 
the risks associated with increased integration under the Free Trade Agreement with the U.S.”  
(under negotiation at the time). It relied for policy design upon dialogue with all interested public 
and private actors, usually represented under organized associations.
39  
The most striking result of the record from this interaction is the prevalence of perceived 
government failures (52 percent of all responses).
40 The three problem categories ranking next, 
however, all point to coordination failures preventing firms from gaining access to new markets 
and new business opportunities; they represent about 30 percent of responses. Poor access to 
technological innovation and insufficient human capital follow, each accounting for around six 
percent of response.  Accordingly, the policies or courses of action requested by the private 
sector as potential solutions to their perceived problems include institutional development in the 
first place. Requests to strengthen cooperation strategies, and help in the development of 
commercialization channels, follow in importance.  
A revision of the private sector’s claims in the context of the Domestic Agenda shows 
that the most required policy efforts fall largely in the quadrant of horizontal public inputs, which 
lie beyond the scope of the present study. These include institutional strengthening, development 
of inter-institutional programs, red tape reduction, improvement of transport infrastructure and 
logistical capacity, development of information systems, and improvement of basic education—
all typically horizontal policy areas. While aspects of these inputs can be more vertical in nature, 
the most salient problems identified by the private sector in the context of the Domestic Agenda 
call for solutions that are not sector-specific in principle. The responses also show that export 
promotion policies designed to facilitate access to information of new markets, 
                                                 
39 Twenty-one ISIC 3-digit sectors, 11 from manufacturing and 10 from services, participated in the Domestic 
Agenda dialogue roundtables. 
40 The highest concentration of complaints occurs in the category of “Regulatory instability / inadequacy.” The 52 
percent statistic results from adding to these the responses under “Weak or lacking institutions,” “Poor or 
insufficient infrastructure services,” and “Insufficient quality control and certification.” Interestingly, only 0.6 
percent of the participants in the dialogue tables point at National security as a limiting factor for their activity. 
  28commercialization channels, and international quality standards are policy instruments that 
address problems clearly identified by the private sector and associated with market failures. To 
that extent they represent good policy design. This is also true of policies for education/training 
improvement (both skill and sector specific) and policies for technological improvement.  
 
3.2.2  Fedesarrrollo’s Entrepreneurial Opinion Survey (EOS) 
 
Perhaps due to the context in which the questions are posed and in the way they are framed, the 
assessment of perceived problems, obtained by means of the PDP module added to the EOS in 
October 2008, provides a different picture of the private sector’s greatest concerns, with “high 
taxes” and “high costs of financing” coming up more frequently
41 (see Table 6). Both sources 
coincide, however, in singling out inadequate infrastructure as one of the most important 
restrictions facing productive activities, and in assigning significant weight to problems arising 
from government failures; 30 percent of all responses fall in this category.
42 
  
Table 6. Perceived Restrictions on Productive Investment (percentage of total responses) 
 
Restrictions to productive investment All Large Medium Small
High taxes 19 19 18 21
Poor or insufficient infrastructure services 16 18 15 9
High cost of financing 15 14 15 22
High input costs 9 10 8 6
Poor or insufficient human capital 7 6 7 18
Difficulty to access international markets information 6 4 8 6
Uncertainty about appropriability of returns due to regulatory instability 6733
Lack of risk capital resources 4 4 4 4
Uncertainty about appropriability of returns due weak competition policy 4 4 4 3
Labor market rigidities 4 3 7 1
Uncertainty about appropriability of returns due to National security problems 4 5 2 0
High costs from red tape and licenses 3 3 3 3
Poor access to financing due to excessive collateral requirements 2 2 2 3
Difficulty to comply with quality standards in international markets 2 1 3 0
100 100 100 100  
 
Responses to the EOS provide support for policies designed to lower the costs of 
financing for all firms, and particularly for smaller firms, for which costly financing is a 
relatively more important restriction (replies of small firms fall in this category 22 percent of the 
time, compared to 15 percent for all firms). This is probably associated with the fact that markets 
                                                 
41 Potential explanations for the differences are provided in Appendix 1. 
42 In addition to lacking infrastructure, problems categories taken into account in this statistic include weak 
competition policy, regulatory instability, National security and high costs from red tape and licenses. 
  29fail to identify good risks among small players with no previous banking history and as a result 
small firms often obtain financing, when they do, from sources outside the financial sector and/or 
at higher costs. Responses to the EOS do not, however, justify sector specific tax cuts or tax cuts 
privileging particular types of firms. The results obtained instead support lower tax rates for all 
firms. 
The EOS shows an increasing use in the 2000s of policy instruments that target 
information and coordination failures preventing entry into new markets
43 (market information, 
support for participation in fairs and events and for contacts with potential clients). Use of tax 
breaks and exemptions is also more pervasive than in previous decade, as is participation in 
quality certification programs. This reflects fairly well the emphasis of the policy supply in 
recent years. Most firms taking advantage of the policy instruments available are, however, 
medium and large firms. Interestingly, small firms show above average participation in programs 
facilitating access to collateral. 
  When asked to rate the policy instruments available, on average 40 percent of firms 
declare to be unsatisfied (see Table A1.). They consider the PDP supply to be inadequately 
designed and/or poorly implemented. Ratings vary somewhat across both instruments and firm 
sizes, and fare best for quality certification, phytosanitary certification and red tape reduction 
programs. Respondents who where active before the 1990s, however, evaluate most PDPs better 
after 2000 than in previous years, apparently reflecting the government’s relative success in 
adjusting its policy supply to more adequately match the needs of the private sector. These 
results must be taken with caution, however, since the private sector can assign a good grade to a 
policy instrument for a reason unrelated to good policy design. For example, firms will tend to 
grade generously any policy that improves their cash flows (and their internal rate of return), 
regardless of whether it is the correct response to an identified market failure. This probably 
explains both the improvement in the evaluation of corporate tax reductions and exemptions, 
which have been widespread since 2002, and the deterioration in the evaluation of Tax 
Reimbursement Certificates for Exporters (CERTs) that were reintroduced in 2002 after being 
suspended, but are now smaller than they used to be. 
 
                                                 
43 Market information, and support for participation in fairs and events, and for contacting potential clients. 
  304. Horizontal PDPs 
 
Colombia has had a long history of horizontal PDPs, mostly in four areas: export promotion, 
support to SMEs (particularly through access to credit), skill training and innovation. This 
section examines the evolution of stated objectives and theoretical conception behind the 
interventions, the design and use of instruments and evidence from previous studies on their 
impact. In addition, it examines recent evidence on use and users assessment of adequacy and 
impact of these instruments based on answers to the Fedesarrollo Entrepreneurial Opinion 
Survey (EOS) conducted for this study; on Foreign Banks, Credit, Interest Rates, Financial 
Shocks and promotion instruments collected from primary sources;
44 on access to credit by 
SMEs from the ANIF SME Survey, and primary data collected from the Superintendence of 
Financial Institutions; and on innovation support instruments from Colciencias and other sources. 
Finally, it summarizes econometric evidence from previous studies on the impact of export 
promotion instruments (mostly from studies before 1991) and presents some updated estimates  
 
4.1  Export Subsidies and Promotion   
 
4.1.1  Rationale for and Evolution of Support Instruments 
 
Colombia has had a long history of export subsidies and promotion schemes, as has been the 
case in most other LAC countries. The rationale, choice of instruments and design criteria have 
varied over time.  
Several instruments designed before trade opening were basically geared to avoid or 
compensate for excess costs imposed by protectionist policies under the ISI strategy and for 
other “government failures” in the spirit of second-best policy. This was particularly the case for 
the following initiatives:  
 
•  Plan Vallejo, a system for input duties drawback instituted in 1959 and still in 
use, applicable to all export sectors. It is a relatively high transaction costs 
system and is thus in practice mostly used by large firms in sectors that are 
intensive in either imported capital goods or intermediate inputs. It has been 
broadened over time to services sectors and fine tuned to avoid discrimination 
against national producers competing with imports (by including an imputed 
                                                 
44 Ministry of Industry and Trade, Bancoldex, Proexport and DIAN. 
  31•  CAT (Certificado de Abono Tributario), a subsidy proportional to exports 
gross value introduced in 1967. This subsidy applied initially to all non-
traditional exports with a basic rate of 15 percent, and its explicit rationale 
was to compensate for the biases against non-traditional exports that resulted 
from import substitution policies.
45 As a consequence, firms benefiting from 
Plan Vallejo did not benefit from CAT. CAT was afterwards converted into 
CERT (Certificado de Reembolso Tributario) with differential rates by sector, 
intended to approximate the value of taxes paid in inputs (to make it more 
compatible with WTO regulations). The average rate was reduced in the 
1980s, and further in the 1990s, until it was basically eliminated in 2002, both 
as a consequence of fiscal stress and to comply with the WTO agreement on 
subsidies. It was temporarily revived in 2007 to compensate some sectors for 
currency overvaluation. In practice, CERT rates have been rather arbitrary, 
responding to a combination of sector-level rent-seeking pressures and fiscal 
constraints. 
•  Export Free Zones (EFZs), instituted by Law 109 of 1985. As in other 
countries, EFZs were thought of both as compensating for government 
failures (reducing transaction costs, avoiding tariffs on inputs and benefiting 
from a stable regime) and outright incentives (income tax exemption). As 
discussed below, EFZs never covered a high proportion of exports, as in other 
countries. EFZs were converted in 2007 to general purpose Free Trade Zones, 
in order to adapt to WTO agreements but also to institute a preferential tax 
regime for large investments, whether oriented to domestic or foreign markets, 
as discussed above. 
 
However, even as early as 1967 an Export Promotion Fund (Proexpo) was created to help 
solve two kinds of perceived market failures.
46  The first kind were those associated with 
coordination problems and entry barrier costs related to gathering of external market 
                                                 
45 See Perry (2008). 
46 See Perry (2008). 
  32information, identification of new export opportunities and opening of new markets for existing 
or new export products. As discussed in Section 3, the fact that “first movers” have to bear these 
market development costs and risks, while followers can benefit freely from first mover 
successes or failures (e.g., benefit from significant externalities), leads to a clear-cut case of an 
important market failure: aggregate underinvestment in developing new exports or penetrating 
new markets, which has been widely recognized in the recent technical literature.
47  
  The second perceived market failure that Proexpo was supposed to solve was related to 
access to credit issues. In particular, the lack of adequate access to export and long term credit, in 
terms comparable to competitors from elsewhere, was perceived as a limitation for export growth 
and diversification, beyond the capacity of individual exporters to overcome. It is debatable to 
what extent this problem of an “uneven playing field” arose from government failures at home 
(insufficient domestic financial market development due to poor policies) and abroad (official 
subsidized credit to exports) or from true market failures (the fact that credit access by a 
particular exporter does not depend on its intrinsic creditworthiness but on overall country risk). 
In any case, it does seem clear from most available studies that access to low-cost export (and 
investment) credit played an important role in facilitating non-traditional export growth
48 and 
that there was a need for this kind of intervention. What was more debatable was the early use of 
public funds and Central Bank credit to extend subsidized credit to exporters, but these features 
of Proexpo were abandoned in 1991. 
Indeed, the Fund, under Central Bank management, was initially financed by an 
additional 1 percent import surtax (increased to 4 percent in 1974) and access to Central Bank 
rediscount facilities.  Proexpo supplied subsidized credit to exporters and trade-related 
information to potential exporters, promoted and supported market contacts, organized trade 
promotion events in Colombia and elsewhere as well as trade missions and attendance of actual 
and prospective exporters at international fairs. It also, on occasions, subsidized transport and 
insurance costs for exporters in a given sector.  
In 1991, Proexpo was split into two independent agencies: Bancoldex (an Export Bank) 
and Proexport (an Export Promotion Agency). This reform was prompted both by specialization 
                                                 
47 See recent analytical contributions supporting the existence of market failures in these areas in Imbs and Warcziag 
(2003); Hausmann and Klinger (2006); Hausmann and Rodrik (2003); Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2008); 
Lederman and Maloney (2007); and De Ferranti et al. (2002). 
48 Villar (1992).   
  33needs and the Constitutional Reform of 1991, which prohibited the Central Bank from 
continuing to extend development credit through rediscount facilities. Bancoldex was 
consequently organized as a public commercial bank, which would be managed in commercial 
terms without receiving budgetary or monetary subsidies apart from its initial capital base. It is 
reputed to have been a well-run bank, so much so that in 2003 the Government decided to 
liquidate the former Industrial Promotion Institute (IFI) and transfer its standing credit lines to 
Bancoldex. Bancoldex, in agreement with the Government, cancelled all existing IFI credit lines 
except those geared to SME finance, which have been expanded substantially from there on, 
becoming the main public credit support agency for SMEs, as indicated in Subsection 4.1.3 
below. Overtime Bancoldex developed other financial instruments for exporters, such as a 
limited export insurance scheme and currency swaps. Currency swaps for agricultural exporters 
have received significant public subsidies in recent years through the Ministry of Agriculture, a 
feature that has been subject to criticisms (see Chapter 2). 
Proexport was given an initial endowment and has received limited budgetary support. It 
is also reputed to be a well-run agency and existing studies have found robust evidence of a 
positive impact of its services on export growth, especially export product diversification.
49 
Because of this success and disappointment with the performance of the FDI Promotion Agency 
(Coinvertir), the Government decided in 2005 to liquidate the latter and transfer its 
responsibilities to Proexport, expecting to capitalize on potential synergies between FDI and 
export promotion activities. 
Finally, while there may be some market failures that justify Bancoldex offers of export 
insurance and currency hedges to exporters, it seems difficult to justify the recent liberal use of 
budget subsidies for hedges in favor of some sectors, as mentioned in Section 2. 
Table 7 summarizes an estimate of the equivalent value of several export promotion 
instruments from 1967 to 1992 (except for EFZs and Proexport services) as a percentage of total 
non-traditional exports value. The total equivalent subsidy was above 20 percent from 1967 to 
1974 (peaking at about 27 percent in 1972 and 1973), mostly due to the high CAT average rates, 
and to the equivalent subsidy of “reintegro anticipado,” a sort of exchange rate subsidy that was 
in effect until 1975. Between 1975 and 1981 CAT rates were drastically reduced to an average 
ranging from 4.5 percent to 7.5 percent. The total equivalent subsidy fell from 1975 to 1977 (to a 
                                                 
49 See Volpe and Caraballo (2007). 
  34range between 10 percent and 13 percent), rose again to around 15 percent from 1978 to 1981, 
due to a rapid increase in subsidized credit, and increased once more to a range of 24-27 percent 
between 1983 and 1985 (years in which Colombia was close to a currency crisis) as CAT rates 
were augmented to averages of 16 percent in 1984 and 18 percent in 1985.
50 From 1986 onwards 
the equivalent total subsidy went down gradually, reaching 7.9 percent in 1992 (and was kept 
below this level during most of that decade) as both CAT rates and subsidized credit receded. 
Plan Vallejo’s effective subsidy was equivalent to approximately 1.5 to 2.5 percent for most of 
the period, except 1986-1989 when tariffs were considerably increased as one of the measures to 
contain the currency crisis, and came down again in 1991. Although we do not have similar 
estimates for implicit subsidies of these export promotion instruments from 1992 onwards, we do 
know that they have been lower than the estimated 1992 value. Indeed, as mentioned above, 
CERT rates were kept low during the 1990s and then virtually eliminated by 2003, to be 
temporarily revived at a 4 percent value for some exports in 2007. Plan Vallejo implicit 
subsidies, however, show an increasing tendency after 1993, and the use of public funds or 
Central Bank credit to extend subsidized credit to exporters was eliminated in 1991. In what 
follows we present the evolution of coverage rates of export promotion instruments. 
 
                                                 
50 In 1984 rates of 30% and 20% were in effect for 259 export products and for 108 products, including most of 
agricultural exports, respectively. 
  35Table 7. Export Incentives, 1967-1992  
 
1967 15.2 1.9 - 6 23.1 76.1 82.9
1968 15.1 2.2 - 3.9 21.2 84 90.1
1969 16.5 1.3 - 1.4 19.1 85.7 90.3
1970 15.7 2.5 - 1.6 19.8 90.3 95.7
1971 16.3 1.9 - 4.3 22.6 95.8 103.9
1972 18.4 2 0.5 6 26.8 99.2 111.3
1973 21.5 2.2 1.1 1.9 26.6 97.5 109.2
1974 19.9 2.3 1.3 0 23.5 95.7 104.6
1975 7.4 1.7 2 1.9 13 100 100
1976 5.8 1.8 1.8 0.8 10.2 95.4 93
1977 4.4 2.2 3.4 - 9.9 85.7 83.4
1978 6.3 2.1 5.7 - 14.1 85.5 86.3
1979 7.2 1.9 5 - 14.1 81.7 82.5
1980 6.9 2.4 5.7 - 15.1 83.5 85
1981 7.6 2 6.8 - 16.4 81.6 84
1982 8.8 1.8 8.2 - 18.8 75.6 79.5
1983 11.9 1.4 10.3 - 23.7 73.6 80.5
1984 15.8 2.1 9.2 - 27 79.9 89.8
1985 18.2 2.8 5.4 - 26.4 91.4 102.2
1986 11.6 3.7 3.1 - 18.4 108.5 113.6
1987 8.6 3.9 3.1 - 15.6 111.2 113.7
1988 8 4.5 1.6 - 14.1 111.3 112.3
1989 8.3 4.4 2.1 - 14.8 113.5 115.3
1990 8.2 3 1.5 - 12.8 127.4 127.2
1991 7.8 2.1 0.7 - 10.6 123.7 121.1
1992 6.2 0.7 1.1 - 7.9 117.5 112.2
REER









   Source: Ocampo and Villar (1993). 
 
4.1.2 Evolution of Individual Instruments 
 
Figure 5 shows an estimate of PV equivalent effective compensatory subsidy for the periods 
1971-1992 and 1993-2006, plotted against the growth of non-traditional exports. The value of 
the effective subsidy appears to have been approximately constant from 1971 to 1983; increased 
substantially after that date as tariffs were raised to help cope with the currency crisis of 1983; 
and dropped significantly from 1991 onwards as tariffs were sharply reduced during trade 
opening.  
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Non traditional exports (% change)
Real exchange rate change
Plan Vallejo subsidy
 
Source: Urrutia et al. (2001) for 1971-1992, Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales de Colombia (DIAN) 
and calculations from the authors for 1993-2006. Plan Vallejo data for the 1993-2006 period includes all imports 
entering under Plan Vallejo exemptions. 
  37In spite of the fact that there has been a VAT rebate for exports since 1974 and tariffs on 
manufactured inputs and capital goods have been relatively low since, around 20 to 30 percent of 
exporters still have a favorable view of the Plan Vallejo drawback system (see Figure 6). 
Presumably this is due not just to the exemption of tariffs on inputs, especially capital goods, but 
also to the simpler import procedures under PV and the financial costs incurred outside the PV 
(VAT rebates on inputs and capital goods are recovered with a delay). 
 


































































Plan Vallejo system Export procedures Real Exchange Rate
 
Source: Fedesarrollo EOS and authors’ calculations of  authors: difference between percentage of 
favorable and unfavorable answers. 
 
Plan Vallejo has been found, though, to be accessible mostly to large permanent 
exporters, as transaction costs related to registration and approvals are non-negligible. Further, 
they appear to have been relatively concentrated in capital-intensive sectors such as mining, 
chemicals and graphic arts, and a few agricultural products, such as flowers, banana, and sugar.
51  
                                                 
51 Garay (1998) and Urrutia et al. (2001). Estimates available from authors on request.  
  38Figure 7 shows the evolution of CAT/CERT average effective rates and non-traditional 
exports growth for two periods (1971/1991 and 1997/2007), collected from different sources. It 
suggests a positive relation between CAT/CERT subsidies and growth rates of non-traditional 
exports with a lag, which is further examined below. As with PV, there has been some 
concentration of CAT/CERT subsidies, benefiting sectors such as sugar, printing, fertilizer and 
apparel sectors in later years, though with significant changes over time.
52  
 

































































































































































































                                                 
52 Estimates available from authors on request. 












































































































































Non traditional exports Cert subsidy
 
Source: Urrutia et al. (2001 ) for 1971-1991, Ministry of Industry and Trade and author calculations for 1998-2007.  
 
 
Figure 8 shows the evolution of Bancoldex credits to exporters. The left-hand panel 
presents an estimate of effective Proexpo credit subsidy, while the right-hand panel presents only 
credit versus value of non-traditional exports. Variations in credit subsidy and coverage seem to 
anticipate export growth rates. There appears to be some concentration, though not much, in 
sectors such as textiles and apparel, chemicals, printing and food products.
53 
                                                 
53 Estimates available from authors on request.  


























































































































































































































































Non traditional exports Bancoldex credit
 
Source: Urrutia et al. (2001) for 1972-1992, Bancoldex and authors’ calculations for 1996-2007. 
  
  41As for Free Trade Zones, earlier ones were established basically as free import zones 
under Law 105 of 1958, mostly for holding inventories of imported goods that would pay tariffs 
when retired from the FTZ for use or sale.
54 In 1985, Law 109 established a modernized Free 
Trade Zones regime for Exports. Six additional new FTZs were created under this law until 
2005.
55 FTZ investment, exports and employment grew, however, rather slowly.  By 2004 
exports from FTZs were just 4.1 percent of total exports as compared to figures from around 50 
percent (Costa Rica, Mexico), 60 percent (Honduras, El Salvador), 80 percent (Nicaragua, 
Dominican Republic) and higher (Puerto Rico, Malaysia, Czech Republic, China) in countries 
that have relied extensively in such an instrument for export promotion).
56  
In order to comply with WTO requirements, Law 1004 of 2005 applied a reduced 15 
percent tax rate (as compared to the statutory tax rate of 33 percent) for all firms established in 
existing or new FTZs, whether dedicated to exports or the local market, as long as they would 
comply with minimum investment and/or employment requirements to be established by a 
regulatory decree. Two successive decrees in 2007 established differential requirements for old 
and new firms located in so called “permanent zones,” agro-industrial zones and port zones, or 
for new or expanding individual firms located anywhere. As discussed in Section 3, the new 
regime amounts to a significant tax reduction for all sorts of large firms that qualify in any one of 
these categories, creating major distortions vis-à-vis existing competing firms. By September 
2008, 37 new FTZs had been approved by a special committee set up for this purpose (with a 
total investment of 4,891 million dollars).
57  
As for Proexport services, we classify them into three groups, following common practice 
in the literature:
58 (1) Counseling and Information, which consist of a wide variety of services 
including training in the export process, provision of information on business opportunities for 
Colombian products in specific target markets and on transport logistics; and support in the 
formulation and execution of export plans; (2) Trade Agenda, which refers to the arrangement of 
appointments with potential customers through the commercial offices of the agency and support 
of commercial management; and (3) Trade fairs, shows, and missions, outgoing and incoming, 
                                                 
54 Barranquilla (1958); Palmaseca, Valle (1970), Cúcuta (1972), Cartagena (1973) and Santa Marta (1974). 
55 Rionegro (Antioquia), Candelaria (Cartagena), Bogotá and Pacífico (Palmira) in 1993, Armenia (Coffee Zone) in 
1996 and Sopo (near Bogotá) in 2000. 
56 Singa (2007). 
57 Twenty-seven of which had already been ratified by the Tax Authority. Seven more requests were under 
consideration, and three had been rejected. 
58 Volpe and Carballo (2008). 
  42organized and co-financed by Proexport. On average Proexport has assisted 2,500 firms per year, 
which represent around 25 percent of exporting firms
59 (see Table 8). The average exporting firm 
exports on average five products to between two and three countries. Firms with larger total 
exports, exporting to more countries and/or more products typically use more Proexport services.  
 
Table 8. Characterization of Exporting Firms and Proexport Coverage 
2003 13,100 182 4,516 9,881 2,933
2004 16,700 192 4,639 11,189 2,109
2005 21,200 185 4,688 11,695 2,690
2006 24,400 197 4,679 11,399 2,752
Number of 
exporting firms









Source: Volpe and Carballo. (2008). Exports in US$ million. 
 
Use of Proexport services varies widely by sector: more than 50 of exporting firms in 
most manufacturing sectors (and up to nearly 80 percent in the food and beverages and textile 
and clothing industries) use some Proexport services, while these figures are substantially lower 
for natural resource-based exporting firms (see Figure 9). 
                                                 
59 Volpe and Carballo (2008). 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ACM A M C
 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade and calculations by the authors. Note: ACM refers to trade agenda, trade missions and counseling; A refers to trade 
agenda; C refers to counseling; and M refers to trade missions. 
. 
  444.1.3  Use and Perception of Adequacy of Instruments: Results of Fedesarrollo EOS 
 
Table 9 of the special EOS module undertaken for this study indicates an increasing percentage 
of firms report having used Bancoldex credit lines (from 48 percent before the 1990s to 64 
percent after 2000) and Proexport services (from an average of 37 percent before the 1990s to 44 
percent after 2000). There was also a modest increase in the use of Plan Vallejo (from 48 percent 
to 52 percent). The use of other export promotion instruments has been more stable overtime.  As 
expected, small firms have had less access to all instruments. 
 
Table 9. Use of Instruments by Firms in the Sample 
 






Bancoldex credit lines 48 54 64
Export insurance or other insurance with government support 31 30 30
Exchange-rate hedging with government support 25 23 26
Cat or Cert. 46 54 45
Free export zones 31 36 35
Plan Vallejo 48 53 52
Market information 34 38 43
Fairs and events 41 43 48
Contact with potential clients 37 36 41
ATPA, ATPDEA or other special tariff agreement 31 35 36  
Source: Fedesarrollo EOS, October 2008. 
 
Table 10 summarizes firms’ opinions on the adequacy of these instruments over time.
60 
Contemporary opinions favor Plan Vallejo over all other instruments, while CERT and 
exchange-rate hedges receive the lowest marks. Opinion trends over time indicate improvements 
in perceptions of the adequacy of most instruments: highly significant in the case of Plan 
Vallejo; significant in the case of Proexport services, FTZs and preferential trade agreements; 
and more modest in the case of export credit. On the contrary, perceptions of the adequacy of 
CERT decline sharply over time.
61  
                                                 
60 Figure 29 tabulates responses only by firms that answered the question for all three periods. Table 3 in Appendix 
1 shows responses by all firms that provided assessments for each individual period. Differences are, in general, not 
large. 
61 Perceptions of adequacy may be affected by increases or decreases (as in the case of CERT) of the amount of 
subsidy per beneficiary. 
  45 There are some differences of opinion by size of firm. Large firms rate Bancoldex export 
credit and Proexport services significantly more favorably (especially market information and 
trade agenda services) than medium-size and small firms. The same is true, though less 
significantly, for Plan Vallejo and ATPDEA usefulness. These differences of opinion probably 
reflect differences in access. On the contrary, small firms rate CERT subsidies significantly 
higher than large or medium size firms, probably because these subsidies make a more 
meaningful difference for those small firms that receive them (see Appendix 1). 
 
Table 10.  Percentage of Firms Rating Instruments as Inadequate 
 






Bancoldex credit lines 24 11 16
Export insurance or other insurance with government support 69 48 38
Exchange-rate hedging with government support 65 61 54
Cat or Cert. 16 21 56
Free export zones 41 32 23
Plan Vallejo 24 10 9
Market information 53 32 25
Fairs and events 53 36 31
Contact with potential clients 68 47 38
ATPA, ATPDEA or other special tariff agreement 45 26 22  
Source: Fedesarrollo EOS, October 2008. 
 
4.1.4 Impact Estimates 
Growth rates of non-traditional exports followed closely the evolution of the real exchange rate, 
including the equivalent subsidies of different export promotion instruments, as shown in Figure 
10, for the period 1967 to 1993.  












































































































































































Real exchange rate change (%)
Non traditional exports growth (%)
 
Source: Ocampo and Villar (1993). 
 
This impressionistic evidence has been confirmed by several previous econometric 
studies,
62 including controls such as the degree of capacity utilization and/or indicators of 
external demand. Such results suggest a positive impact of export subsidies. However, most of 
the variation of the effective real exchange rate was due to variations in the real exchange rate 
and not on the subsidies themselves. Some of these studies also found important differences in 
the response of exports to the effective real exchange rate in different sectors. Typically, 
elasticities were lower or non-significant in the case of capital-intensive sectors.  
We performed similar exercises on more recent data for the manufacturing sector.  The 
model used was an ISIC 3-digit sector level fixed effects regression explaining export growth. 
Export promotion policies were used as explanatory variables together with contemporary world 
                                                 
62 See, for example, Villar (1984 and 1992), Ocampo and Villar (1993), Steiner and Wüllner (1994), Mesa, Cock 
and Jiménez (1999), Echavarria (1980), Botero and Meisel (1988), Alonso (1993), Quintero (1997), Roberts and 
Tybout (1997), and Urrutia et al. (2001). 
  47imports (as an indicator of external demand), real devaluation and GDP growth per year. The 
results are shown in Table 11 below. Export promotion policy variables enter the estimation as a 
share of exports,
63 and the first regression also includes tariffs and tax exemption rates among the 
explanatory variables. All policy variables enter the regressions with a lag. Together with the 
fixed effects, this should mitigate biases from potential endogeneity of these variables.  
Coefficients on the export promotion policy variables are significant, except for CERT, 
and have the expected sign, indicating that Plan Vallejo and export credit did have a positive 
effect on export growth in the period under examination, after controlling for other determinants 
of sector-level export growth. Usage of Proexport services was also included, but results are 
swept away by the sector-level fixed effects because of little variance over time.
64 The 
coefficient on tariffs is negative and significant, indicating that protection does not seem to 
contribute to export growth, and the coefficient on the tax exemption rate is found to be not 
significantly different to zero. We explored the effect of interactions but did not find statistically 
significant effects of these variables. 
                                                 
63 Bancoldex credit and CERT subsidies correspond to amounts effectively received by each sector. Plan Vallejo 
refers to all imports entering under Plan Vallejo exemptions under the corresponding ISIC code. While it is often 
true that inputs belong in the same ISIC category than the final products they are used to produce, the measure as it 
is may be reflecting exemptions on inputs used by other exporting sectors (competition in the domestic market) 
and/or missing exempt input imports corresponding to the ISIC sectors under consideration. The value of exempt 
imports corresponding to each ISIC 3-digit sector, regardless of the ISIC code of the imported inputs (which would 
be a more accurate measure of subsidies under Plan Vallejo), has been requested from DIAN but is not yet available. 
64 We only have Proexport services data available for three years. 
  48Table 11. Determinants of Sector-Level Export Growth, 1996-2006, 
Fixed Effects Regression 
 
Dependent variable: annual export growth (%) (1) (2)
Plan Vallejo / Exports (t-1) 0.33 0.38
(0.176)* (0.151)**
Bancoldex credit / Exports (t-1) 0.15 0.15
(0.704)* (0.060)**




Tax exemption rate (t-1) -0.60
(0.777)
World imports (log) 0.18 0.16
(0.098)* (0.092)*
Real exchange rate change (t-1) 2.50 2.34
(0.369)*** (0.385)***
Real exchange rate change (t-2) 0.96 0.88
(0.362)** (0.374)**




Number of observations 233 308
R
2  0.23 0.23  
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by year. ISIC 3-digit 
sector fixed effects. *** 1% significant, ** 5%  significant and 
* 10% significant. 
 
  49Some studies have attempted to separate long-term and short-term effects of the real 
exchange rate and external demand.
65 They have found strong evidence of long-term effects and 
weak or no evidence of short-term effects and volatility. These studies, however, do not include 
the equivalent subsidy of the different export promotion instruments. However, their results 
could lead to the hypothesis that stable instruments (such as Plan Vallejo or export credit) could 
have been more effective than those whose subsidy rate has varied significantly over time (as in 
the case of the CAT/CERT), which is consistent with our results. 
A recent study
66 estimated the effects of Proexport services, by using multiple treatment 
matching techniques on export data for all exporting firms using different combinations of these 
services or none at all. They found that firms that do not use Proexport services tend to have a 
weaker export performance than those that use any Proexport service, both in terms of increases 
in number of markets and products exported.
67 They also found that those that used all Proexport 
services showed better export performance than those that used only one type of service. 
Estimated impact was lower for those that only attended fairs or missions but did not use trade 
agenda or information services. 
In contrast to the results noted above, a rather negative assessment of the role of export 
promotion policies on the development of new export sectors comes from a recent study on the 
determinants of success in the emergence of four specific groups of products: cut flowers, 
underwear and swimwear, sanitary products and confectionery products.
68 The study concluded 
that “the export discoveries” studied emerged exclusively from the private initiative of 
entrepreneurs who bore all the costs and assumed all the risks of the investments. Information 
regarding these potential new exports in none of the cases came from public information or 
strategic alliances between the government and the entrepreneurs. Nor was there a deliberate 
policy to support the sectors or products where discoveries occurred. Exporters recognized 
having benefited from policies specifically designed to promote non-traditional exports
69 but 
considered that impact limited in scope. Plan Vallejo had the greatest effect since it allowed 
producers to overcome import restrictions. In some cases Proexpo credits were useful, as were 
                                                 
65 Reinhart (1995), Caballero y Corbo (1989), Arize (1999), Misas, Ramírez and Silva (2001) 
66 Volpe and Carballo (2008). 
67 Firms that used all services tended to have a rate of growth of exports 27 percent higher (13 percent in number of 
countries and 12 percent in number of products exported) than for similar firms that did not use any Proexport 
service. 
68 Arbeláez, Meléndez and León (2007).  
69 They also acknowledged the contribution of a positive macro and trade policy environment.  
  50some other promotional measures, such as participation in international fairs, dissemination of 
information about foreign markets, and organization of commercial missions to different 
countries to bring buyers and sellers together. But exporters considered that government support 
in helping investors to solve coordination problems or address market failures was neither well 
organized nor systematic. The main obstacles faced by pioneers were related to transportation, 
infrastructure, export/import procedures (registration), phytosanitary issues (especially in the 
cases of flowers, mangos, and confectionary goods), and entry barriers or protectionist measures 
faced in foreign markets (e.g., dumping cases and phytosanitary barriers). Other common 
uncertainties were those related to the level of knowledge of foreign markets, competitors, the 
size and characteristics of the demand, and consumers’ needs. The government was helpful only 
in specific cases, and only sporadically with respect to those problems. In general terms, 
obstacles were overcome through coordination among pioneers (as in the case of flowers), or 





Colombia has been relatively successful in diversifying its exports and obtaining high rates of 
non-traditional exports growth since 1967. But, how much of these achievements can be 
attributed to export promotion instruments or to the overall macro environment, including real 
exchange rate levels and volatility?  And how adequate has the design of export promotion 
instruments been? It would appear from previous studies that there was an important positive 
combined effect of real exchange management and export subsidies from 1967 up to 1991. It is 
difficult, though, to separate these effects.  
From 1991 onwards, new evidence from this study suggest a positive and significant 
effect of Plan Vallejo (the duty drawback system) and export credit, in spite of an environment 
of higher volatility in the real effective exchange rate (REER) and the sharp reduction of the 
magnitude of subsidies thereafter. Firms’ assessments also suggest that Plan Vallejo continues to 
play an important role, in spite of tariff reductions, especially for capital-intensive sectors and 
sectors intensive in imported inputs, for which the combined effect of duties and delays in VAT 
rebates could be substantial. It thus appears to be an effective “second-best” policy, given the 
permanence of tariffs and delays in VAT rebates.  
                                                 
70 The study notes that foreign partners were significantly more positive in their assessment of government 
contributions than local producers. 
  51Also, firms report increasing use and satisfaction with Proexport services, especially with 
trade agenda and market information services, which apparently respond to important perceived 
market failures. A recent study estimated a significant effect of these services in increasing the 
number of markets and products exported. However, it appears that such services or other 
promotion instruments have played a minor role in the successful development of new export 
sectors, as indicated from available studies for four cases. 
  Subsidies such as CAT/CERT or initial subsidized export credit through Proexpo 
probably had justification in eras high tariffs (as not all firms could access Plan Vallejo due to 
high transaction costs) and reduced access to credit. As these costs and constraints have eased 
(see next section on access to credit by SMEs), there appeared to be little justification for 
keeping outright subsidies, and indeed they have tended to disappear, with temporary exceptions 
such as the recent selective compensation for real exchange appreciation.  
It is more difficult to assess the effects of FTZs. When they were Export Promotion 
Zones they had much lower importance, in terms of investment, exports or employment, than 
successful uses of such instruments elsewhere. Now that they have been converted to general- 
purpose free trade zones and their use is exploding, they may facilitate some new export 
initiatives. Since this is no longer their only objective, however, they cannot be classified as 
“export promotion interventions” but rather as a way to grant tax incentives to large investment 
projects, whether intended for exports or for the domestic market.  
Finally, there are no estimates of the effects of exchange rate hedging or export insurance 
supports. There may be some market failures in these markets, but they do not seem to justify the 
liberal use of subsidies recently given to currency hedges in some sectors. 
  
4.2  Training 
 
4.2.1 Rationale and Evolution 
 
Externalities associated with training and skills acquisition have been recognized for long. On 
the one hand, individual workers cannot appropriate the full social benefits of investments in 
their own skills, as long as there are agglomeration benefits: a more skilled worker will not only 
be more productive but increase the productivity of others with whom he interacts, in his own 
firm and elsewhere. Thus, left to themselves individuals will under-invest in training. Nor can 
firms investing in training of their workforce fully appropriate the resulting benefits as a 
  52consequence of labor mobility. Other firms in the same or other sectors, in the national economy 
or elsewhere, will benefit from such an investment. Hence a classic market failure develops: left 
to themselves, firms and individuals will in the aggregate invest sub-optimally in training.  These 
arguments have led many countries either to subsidize private training or, more often in Latin 
America, to create public training institutes financed by taxes.
71 
In 1957 Colombia created SENA (the Spanish acronym for the National Institute for 
Learning), a public agency devoted to technical training, financed by a compulsory 
“contribution” (i.e., tax) on wages. SENA’s board has been presided by the Minister of Labor 
(now Social Protection) and is composed by representatives of Government, employers and 
unions. Although there was a general consensus on the positive contributions of SENA in its 
initial years of activity, since the early nineties, with the increased competitive pressures 
originating in trade opening, there have been strong critiques about the inefficiency and 
inadequacy of many SENA programs. Consequently there have been several attempts at major 
reform, mostly directed towards establishing a competitive market for training services, which 
have faced significant union and political opposition and resulted in marginal or incremental 
adjustments (in 1990 and 1994), providing some limited room for competition of training 
services financed through the wage tax. A couple of recent studies have attempted to evaluate the 
effectiveness of SENA
72 and found large inefficiencies (significantly larger costs than private 
sector providers); lower impact of SENA programs, as compared to private service, on future 
wages and firms productivity; and a poor opinion by firms on the adequacy and quality of 
programs.  
Furthermore firms and trainees that pay for the services chose SENA in less than 16 
percent of cases, and even those that get free access to SENA’s services chose it in only 50 
percent of cases. Thus, in spite of its huge budget, the institute was effectively supplying only 
around 20 percent of training services. Of the remainder, 17 percent were supplied by other 
public institutes, 38 percent by private providers, and 25 percent by firms themselves.  
 
4.2.2 Firms’ Assessments of Skills Availability 
 
To start with, most firms do not see skills availability as a binding constraint for growth or 
competitiveness. A Fedesarrollo special survey carried on in 2003 indicated that only around 13 
                                                 
71 See Burki, Perry, Gill, Guasch and Maloney in De Ferranti et al., editors (2003b). 
72  Gaviria and Nuñez (2003); Barrera and Corchuelo (2004). 
  53percent of firms considered the “quality of the supply of production workers” a “major obstacle” 
affecting the ability to compete, while an additional 28 percent ranked this factor as a “minor 
obstacle” for competitiveness. The corresponding figures for the “quality of trained personnel 
(technicians)” were only 15 percent and 35 percent.  Comparatively, firms ranked taxes, access 
to or cost of capital and labor costs and labor market rigidity as significantly more serious 
obstacles to competitiveness (see Figure 11). This notwithstanding, 61.7 percent of firms in the 
same survey responded that the quality of the supply of trained personnel was low. 
Corresponding figures were 47.5 percent for large firms and 72.1 percent for small firms, 
indicating that the latter have more difficulty in obtaining adequately trained workers when they 
need them. 
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Source: Fedesarrollo SENA survey, 2003. 
 
In the same vein, only 7 percent of firms responding to the special module of the 
Fedesarrollo Survey carried out for this study ranked the lack of adequately qualified human 
capital (either with basic or specialized technical skills or professional training) as a major factor 
limiting firm expansion. To compare with, the corresponding figure for “high cost of financing” 
  54was 15 percent. There were large differences, though, among large and small firms: the latter 
quoted the lack of adequately qualified workers as one of the five main factors limiting firm 
expansion in 52 percent of the cases with respect to basic technical skills, 35.4 percent with 
respect to professional skills and 18.8 percent with respect to specialized technical skills. The 
corresponding figures for large firms were just 9.7 percent, 5.5 percent and 5.9 percent (see 
Table 12).  
 
Table 12. Limitations for Productive Investment 
1¡ 1¡-5¡ 1¡ 1¡-5¡ 1¡ 1¡-5¡ 1¡ 1¡-5¡
High credit cost 20.2 15 18.6 14 20.2 15 26.7 22
Lack of collateral to access credit  2.4 2 2.1 2 2.1 2 4.4 3.0
Lack of human capital adequately qualified at professional level  2.2 6.7 1.7 5.1 3.3 5.0 2.5 35.1
Lack of human capital adequately qualified at technical specialized level  2.9 8.3 2.2 5.5 2.2 7.4 7.4 30.2
Lack of human capital adequately qualified at technical basic level  2.2 9.6 2.2 8.8 1.1 8.7 4.9 15.9
Small firms
Restrictions to productive investment
National total Large firms Medium firms 
 
Source: Fedesarrollo EOS, October 2008 
 
Interestingly, in our interviews with the private competitiveness council, managers of 
highly innovative firms quoted the low supply of qualified specialized professional as the factor 
limiting their potential to expand exports in frontier sectors. A similar opinion came from 
ACOPI, the association of small industrial enterprises -the other extreme- for whom low skills of 
micro and small entrepreneurs themselves are the main limiting factor for competitiveness. This 
opinion coincides with the EOS’ result and resonates with the findings of recent studies on 
informality that have concluded that in most cases micro firms remain informal because of their 
low productivity potential, which in turn is a reflection of low skills of micro entrepreneurs. In 
other words, lack of adequate skills seems to be a severely limiting factor at the wide bottom 
(micro and small firms) and at the narrow top (the leading technological firms), but not for the 
majority of medium size and large firms. 
 
4.2.3 Use of Training Providers 
A special Fedesarrollo 2003 SENA special survey found that around 70 percent of firms 
sponsored SENA apprentices, 60 percent used training services (of which 35 percent used 
specialized training services) and 52 percent hired SENA graduates. Use of some new SENA 
services, however, such as technological services were quite low (around 12 percent) Differences 
by size of firm remained large. Nearly 90 percent of large firms still sponsored apprentices, 76 
percent used training services (50 percent using specialized training services) and 63 percent 
  55hired SENA graduates, while the corresponding numbers for small firms were 48 percent, 44 
percent (25 percent specialized) and 48 percent. Use of technological services was equally low 
across firm sizes. 
The EOS module designed for this study shows lower figures than the 2003 Survey. 
Around 34 percent of firms reported using SENA general training services and 33 percent 
specialized training services. Similarly, 37 percent reported using other public training services, 
and 30 percent private training services. Some 34 percent reported carrying out in-house and on-
the-job training. Small firms used less private training services and more specific training 
through SENA than large and medium firms. There appear to be no major differences by size in 
the use of other public training services or in-house training. The answers suggest that firms have 
reduced the use of all types of external training services over time, while keeping the same level 
of on-the-job training efforts. 
 
Table 13. Use of Training Programs  
Policy instrument Total Large Medium Small
Basic training through SENA 34 33 35 36
Specific training through SENA 33 36 23 45
Training through other government owned institute 37 36 42 33
Training through private institute 30 30 33 25
Training within the firm 34 36 30 40  
Source: EOS Fedesarrollo Survey, 2008. 
 
Workers with higher (tertiary) education prefer private training services. The probability 
of attending private training services also increases with the level of formality and with the 
education profile of parents (see Barrera and Corchuelo, 2004). 
 
4.2.4 Assessment of Training Providers  
Firms are generally very critical of the quality of training services, especially those offered by 
SENA. To begin with, nearly 80 percent of respondents (61 percent of the sample) in the special 
2003 Survey stated that there was a low supply of skilled workers and that SENA and other 
technical programs and technical schools failed to improve labor skills for experienced workers. 
More than 80 percent stated that those facilities and programs also failed to develop labor skills 
for new graduates (see Figure 12
73). 
                                                 
73 Fedesarrollo, SENA Survey, 2003 
  56Figure 12. Reasons for “Low” Supply of Trained Workers 
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Source: Fedesarrollo SENA Survey, 2003.  
 
When comparing SENA to other providers, a large majority of firms answered that 
SENA had fewer incentives and less ability to adjust to technical changes in training needs and 
higher costs. A majority also felt that efficiency and quality was lower (see Figure 13). Small 
firms tended to have a more positive perception of quality than medium or large firms (a simple 
majority of small firms ranked SENA’s quality as higher than that of competitors) but similar 
perceptions of poor incentives and ability to adjust to changing needs and higher costs.
74 
                                                 
74 Fedesarrollo (2004). 
  57Figure 13. SENA versus Others Provider of Training: Index 
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Source: Fedesarrollo SENA Survey (2003). 
 
The EOS module designed for this study indicates that perceptions about the adequacy of 
SENA programs have improved overtime. While 38 percent of firms thought that general 
training in SENA was deficient before the 1990s, only 24 percent considered it deficient in the 
present decade (see Table 14). The corresponding figures for specialized training are 45 percent 
and 27 percent. Ratings are better for private providers and in house training (only 18 percent 
and 15 percent, respectively, thought that their services were deficient) and worse for other 
public provider services (54 percent considered them deficient), for which there is little 
perception of improvement over time. Contrary to previous surveys results, small firms rate 
SENA services worse than large firms do. Similar gaps are found in their ratings of private 
training services, indicating that small firms have less access than large firms to high-quality 
private services, though they still rank them as more adequate than SENA’s. 
  58Table 14. Percentage of Firms Rating Instruments as Inadequate 
 






Basic training through SENA 38 24 24
Specific training through SENA 45 28 27
Training through other government owned institute 58 54 54
Training through private institute 29 27 18
Training within the firm 27 16 15  
Source: Fedesarrollo EOS, October 2008. 
 
When asked about desired changes in SENA, about 50 percent of firms responding to the 
2003 special survey indicated that they would prefer SENA to administer the training budget 
(financed out of wage taxes) and let employers and trainees choose providers, while 43 percent 
preferred to keep SENA’s virtual monopoly (“keep SENA as it is”) but improve programs and 
efficiency. Only 2 percent thought that no major changes were needed. A large share of firms of 
firms also considered that SENA required significant improvements in attention to firms with 
needs for technical improvements (62 percent), poor workers (59 percent), unemployed workers 
(58 percent) and SMEs (57 percent). Respondents also noted that SENA needed to improve in 
regard to selection of young students (43 percent), worker trainees (35 percent) and firms (35 




Gaviria and Nuñez (2003), controlling for selection biases, somewhat surprisingly found a 
significantly negative effect on wages and employment probability for workers attending SENA 
training as compared to equivalent workers who did not undergo training. They also found 
negative, though lower, effects of training in other public institutions and high and significantly 
positive effects on both wages and probability of employment of attending private training 
services.  
Barrera and Corchuelo (2004), in a more detailed exercise, arrived at a just slightly 
different conclusion. According to them, SENA training seems to yield modest positive effects 
on wages for male and formal workers, as compared to wages of similar workers with no 
training. However, if the comparison group is other trainees, attending SENA yields negative 
  59results. Further, SENA returns seem to be a negative function of education levels and a negative 
function of years of experience.  
The study by Barrera and Corchuelo interestingly replicates some previous studies, using 
their data and more updated econometric techniques to deal with selection biases. They 
consistently find modest or negative results for SENA training, except for the earlier period 
(around 30 years ago). Further, SENA trainees come today from the lower tail of the ability 
distribution, while this does not seem to be the case for 30 years ago. The authors hypothesize 
that these changes may be explained by the fact that SENA was initially not just a relatively 
effective monopoly provider, but the only option for income-constrained workers, while now 
changing technologies and needs, more competition from other providers and higher incomes 
and financial market access have challenged its ability to adapt, rendering it obsolete as a 
training alternative. 
 
4.2.6  Conclusion  
All results presented in this section suggest the urgent need for facilitating increased competition 
in training services and doing away with SENA’s virtual monopoly in the use of earmarked wage 
taxes. These in addition have been found to be an important incentive for informality
75. The 
political economy question that remains unanswered, though, is why several reform initiatives in 
this direction have failed to succeed and changes have been rather marginal.  
 
4.3. Microfirms and SMEs: Access to Credit and Other Financial Services 
4.3.1  Rationale for Interventions 
Micro enterprises constitute around 96 percent of firms in Colombia and, together with SMEs, 
are responsible for around 80 percent of private employment.
76 Most of micro enterprises are 
informal, low productivity and high rotation firms with little growth potential. However, a 
fraction of them can be highly productive (TFP above average in their sectors) and have 
significant growth potential, often impaired by lack of access to credit, training, marketing 
support and formal institutions.
77 As firms grow in size, growth potential increases and formality 
and access to credit and other services and institutions improve. However, limitations remain 
                                                 
75 See Cunningham  (2000). 
76 CONPES Policy Document No. 3484. 
77 See Perry et al. (2007), and Cárdenas and Rozo (2007).  
  60associated with the higher transaction costs associated in extending credit and other services to 
small as compared to large firms. In particular, costs associated with information gathering, 
credit analysis, account management and legal aspects related to collateral and enforcement have 
large fixed components and hence do not grow in proportion to the size of loans and beneficiary 
firms. Such large differences in transaction costs are usually considered as leading to important 
market failures.  
Which interventions might be efficient in reducing these transaction costs and facilitating 
micro and SME firms with growth potential to achieve it, by overcoming restrictions in access to 
credit and other services, while avoiding subsidizing micro and SME firms with no growth 
potential? There are probably no clear-cut answers to this question and, thus, interventions in 
these areas must be judged by the balance between Type I (leaving firms with growth potential 
without access to credit and other services) and Type II (subsidizing firms with no growth 
potential) errors. In particular, given the much higher proportion of micro and SME firms 
without growth potential, generalized subsidies to all micro or SME firms would be highly 
inefficient. On the contrary, some market-based interventions, which may be taken advantage of 
primarily by firms with growth potential, might show a positive cost-benefit ratio. 
Colombia has had a relatively long history of interventions geared to extend credit access 
to micro, small and medium enterprises.
78 Early interventions took the form of the creation of a 
state-owned specialized financial intermediary (Corporación Financiera Popular), which 
operated between 1968 and 1998, and a guarantee fund (Fondo Nacional de Garantías-FNG) 
which was created in 1982 with equity provided by the Instituto de Fomento Industrial (IFI) and 
the Association of Pymes (ACOPI).  The latter has been frequently capitalized with public 
budget resources.
79 IFI and subsequently Bancoldex, after IFI was merged with it in 2003, have 
offered special credit lines and financial services for microenterprises and SMEs (MIPYMES). 
As shown below, both FNG and Bancoldex operations with microenterprises and SMEs have 
grown significantly in recent years.
80 More recently, the Banca de Oportunidades program 
launched in 2006 has promoted agreements between authorities and commercial banks to extend 
access to financial services to municipalities without previous banking facilities, thus helping 
                                                 
78 In addition there are other programs to support micro and SME creation and growth, such as officially supported 
venture capital and incubators, technical assistance and subsidies to R&D, which we do not discuss here. 
79 A new capitalization is envisaged through a draft law on Financial Reform being discussed in Congress at the time 
of writing. 
80 Salazar and Guerra (2007). 
  61local microenterprises and SMEs access financial services. There have been as well recent 
regulatory changes geared to facilitating the development of microcredit by commercial banks
81 
and financial leasing and factoring, which are of special importance for MIPYMES. Most 
commercial banks have opened specialized sections on microcredit and SMEs, utilizing 
techniques developed by NGOs working in this field such as scoring to help assess risk profiles 
and bring down transaction costs. Few of these instruments are exempt from Type II errors (with 
the exception of regulatory changes), but they may have a positive cost-benefit ratio depending 
on implementation details. 
To begin with, some of these interventions appear in principle to be adequate second-best 
responses to a market failure typical of underdeveloped credit markets. In such markets, due to 
excessive asymmetric information and enforcement problems, credit is usually rationed in an 
inefficient manner through the generalized use of collateral and personal relations.  Such a 
market failure should be overcome, in the long run, through institutional solutions: reducing 
asymmetric information costs through credit bureaus; improving (legal and judiciary) 
enforcement institutions; and influencing informal institutions (“repayment culture”).  However, 
such “first best” actions are frequently slow to evolve (e.g., improving the judiciary) or 
politically difficult to establish. Thus, due to constitutionally mandated protection of privacy and 
a historical tradition and prevalent culture of protecting the debtor (common to other Latin 
American countries), efforts to institute effective credit bureaus and to reform laws relating to 
creditor rights have faced significant political opposition. Under such circumstances, credit 
rationing through generalized use of collateral and personal relations might prevail for a long 
time, and second best interventions oriented to overcome restrictions of access to credit by micro 
and SME firms with growth potential, originating in their lack of collateral and direct relations 
with bank managers, might be an efficient solution. 
In this light, partial credit guarantees by FNG appear as a particularly potentially efficient 
second best policy. It can be argued that a centralized guarantee fund will achieve both savings 
from broader risk pooling and economies of scale in setting up scoring and other techniques to 
reduce the effect of asymmetric information problems. As long as commercial banks retain a 
significant share of risk, Type II errors might be kept under control. The devil is in the details, 
                                                 
81 Mostly related to flexibilizing interest rate “caps” (“usura” limits) that were constraining its development. 
  62though, and while the Colombian and Chilean guarantee funds appear to perform rather well, this 
is not the case of similar initiatives in other Latin American countries, as discussed below. 
Similarly, government-sponsored agreements with commercial banks to serve 
underserved areas may be an efficient second best policy, as long as the compensation provided 
is not excessive. Such compensation, however, should be preferably subsidies allocated through 
auctions rather than opaque regulatory agreements, as seem to be the case in Colombia. 
More debatable is the use of subsidized rediscount facilities. The initial high subsidy of 
IFI lines has been replaced by a much lower subsidy implicit in Bancoldex lines. Bancoldex does 
not receive direct public subsidies, though there are some implicit subsidies through the use of 
public capital.  Bancoldex rediscount lines appear attractive to banks as they reduce their 
liquidity risks and costs. Credit risk remains with banks, limiting the scope for distortions. SMEs 
often request simultaneously FNG partial guarantees and credits supported through Bancoldex 
rediscount lines. Given the large expansion of credit to SMEs in recent years, as shown below, 
the combination of these two instruments appears to have been highly effective. 
A clearly inferior second best solution was the establishment of a public bank, as there is 
no reason to believe that such an institution would be better than private banks in collecting 
information or assessing risks, not to mention the fact that it is prone to be affected by political 
interference. In fact, for these reasons the initial solution of a specialized public bank (CFP) was 
abandoned early in Colombia in favor of more market-friendly interventions. 
 
4.3.2  Evolution of Access to Credit and Public Programs 
Figure 14 shows the evolution of credit to microenterprises and SMEs by type of financial 
intermediary, which followed closely the performance of overall credit until 2002. Growth has 
been quite fast in recent years, though comparable figures are not available. As shown in the 
figure, most SME credit is presently supplied through commercial banks and other private 
financial institutions, and the direct official credit contribution is quite small. However, credit 
through commercial banks is partially supported through FNG guarantees and Bancoldex (and 
Finagro) SME rediscount credit lines, which have grown significantly in recent years (Figure 
14).   
  63Figure 14. Credit Amounts Provided to Microfirms and SME Firms 
by Type of Financial Institution 
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Source: Superfinanciera and authors’ calculations.   
 
  64Since IFI was merged with Bancoldex in 2003, Bancoldex liquidated most previous IFI 
credit lines in favor of large firms and gave a strong push to the consolidation of microenterprise 
and SME credit lines as shown in panel b. of Figure 15. Relatively large explicit subsidies in 
initial CFP and IFI lines were replaced by market-based rates in Bancoldex lines, with relatively 
low implicit subsidies originating in the use of official capital and multilateral credit lines.  
 
Figure 15. 
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Source: www.sigob.gov.co, Bancoldex 2006 and authors’ calculations. 
  654.3.3  Assessments of Access to Financial Services by SMEs  
 
A recently launched biannual SME Survey by ANIF (National Association of Financial 
Institutions), Bancoldex and Banco de la República, provides a clear assessment of SMEs’ 
present access to credit and other financial services. Figure 16 shows that around 54 percent of 
SMEs in industry actually demand credit; corresponding rates for SMEs in retail trade and 
services are 48 percent and 43 percent, respectively. Credit approval rates are very high (around 
95 percent), Most credit is used for working capital, and only a small fraction goes to acquiring 
machinery or debt consolidation (Panel B). Indeed, recent assessments by users suggest that 
SME access to short and medium-term credit is presently indeed quite satisfactory, but that is not 
the case for longer-term credit for investment (see below). 
 
Figure 16. Percentage of Pymes (SMEs) that Asked for and Obtained Credit 
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Source: ANIF SME Survey and authors’ estimates.
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82 ANIF in association with Bancoldex, BID y Banco de la República 
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Figure 17 shows the use of other sources of financial resources by SMEs. It is to be 
noted that use of leasing and factoring is quite low, as compared to what happens in other 
countries. Also, as in other countries, access to capital markets is quite limited. 
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Source: ANIF SME Survey and authors’ calculations. 
  67The Asobancaria SME Survey suggests that working capital is well supplied; that credit 
for investment is somewhat more limited; and that factoring services are quite underdeveloped 
(Figure 18). A recent Fedesarrollo study on the subject came to similar conclusions.
83 In contrast, 
acomparative study by IDB (2006) indicated that Colombia was well behind other Latin 
American countries such as Argentina and Chile in the development of risk capital funds and 
“angel” investors.
84 Given the increasingly recognized importance of private equity funds for 
emerging successful micro and small enterprises, Bancoldex has recently launched a promising 
Fund of Funds initiative in this regard.
85 
 














Discount in commercial papers
Specialized debit cards
Pay services through telephone
Credit for expansion
Advise and training SMEs
Collect services
Specialized credit cards
Specialized services in foreign trade
Credit for working capital
Pay services through Internet
 
Sources: Asobancaria SME Survey (2007). 
                                                 
83 Salazar and Guerra (2007).  
84 IDB (2006). 
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4.3.4  Assessments by Firms Responding to the Fedesarrollo 2008 EOS 
Previous Fedesarrollo EOSs coincide with previous indicators that the importance of restrictions 
on access and cost of credit as a constraint to investment has been rapidly diminishing, as shown 
in Figure 19.  
 
























































































Lack of export incentives Lack of national credit
Lack of international credit Lack of self-financial resources
 
               Source: Fedesarrollo EOS, annual investment module. 
 
The module added to the EOS for this study found that lack of access to credit is not an 
important concern for small firms. However, cost of credit is still mentioned by around 21 
percent of small firms as their main restriction on investment, and by 12.5 percent as the second 
most important restriction. The corresponding figures for medium-sized firms are 14.7 percent 
and 18.9 percent, and for large firms 11.9 percent and 13.5 percent. Access to risk capital also 
appears as a significant restriction for small firms; 6.8 percent indicated it was their main 
restriction, as compared to 1.1 percent and 0.9 percent among large and medium-sized firms, 
respectively.  
  69Around 64 percent of small firms reported using Bancoldex credit, 29 percent official 
agricultural credit and 23 percent FNG guarantees. Use of Bancoldex credit increased over time, 
while official agricultural credit diminished.  
  
Table 15. Use of Official Credit Lines 









IFI credit lines 45 44 12
Bancoldex credit lines 48 54 64
Finagro, Caja Agraria o Banco Agrario credit lines 35 33 29
Collateral obtained through Fondo de Garant’as 25 26 23
Export insurance or other insurance with government support 31 30 30
Exchange-rate hedging with government support 25 23 26  
    Source: Fedesarrollo EOS, October 2008. 
 
Table 16 indicates that a high proportion of firms (39 percent) currently assess official 
agricultural credit lines as not adequate for their needs. These percentages are much lower in the 
case of Bancoldex lines (16 percent) and FNG guarantees (29 percent). There have been 
significant improvements in perception of adequacy of FNG guarantees over time, and more 
modest improvement with respect to Bancoldex lines, in contrast to a deterioration of opinion on 
agricultural official lines and former IFI lines. 
These assessments vary significantly in some cases by size of firm. The share of large 
firms that view Bancoldex lines as “excellent” is much larger than in the case of small firms, 
reflecting remaining difficulties of SMEs in accessing export credit. In contrast, the share of 
small firms that view FNG guarantees and agricultural official lines as “excellent” or “good” is 
much larger than in the case of large firms, indicating that these services are proportionally more 
important for small firms. 
 
  70Table 16. Percentage of Firms Rating Instruments as Inadequate 
 






IFI credit lines 17 16 38
Bancoldex credit lines 24 11 16
Finagro, Caja Agraria o Banco Agrario credit lines 27 27 39
Collateral obtained through Fondo de Garantías 43 36 29
Export insurance or other insurance with government support 69 48 38
Exchange-rate hedging with government support 65 61 54  
        Source: Fedesarrollo EOS, October 2008. 
 
4.3.5  Conclusion 
 
Market failures in financial sectors are widely recognized. There is, however, less agreement on 
interventions to support SMEs’ access to credit. In this section we take the position that those 
interventions that facilitate access to credit to many small firms with growth potential, while 
avoiding subsidizing credit to small firms with no or low growth potential (Type II errors), may 
have a positive social cost-benefit ratio. In this context, we find that Colombian policy has 
moved from highly inefficient interventions (a dedicated public bank and highly subsidized 
rediscount credit lines) towards more efficient and effective interventions.  
In particular, we argue that FNG guarantees seem to focus well, as a second best policy, 
on a specific observable market failure (many small firms with growth potential lack access 
because there is credit rationing through use of collateral). We further show that the growth in 
the combined use of FNG guarantees and Bancoldex rediscount lines has facilitated a fast 
increase in credit to SMEs in recent years (admittedly in a context of high liquidity and economic 
growth), to the point that access to credit is no longer seen as a major restriction for investment 
(though cost still is for many). Eliminating regulatory hurdles has also contributed to the recent 
growth in microcredit by commercial banks. While the rationale for rediscount lines is more 
tenuous, the fact that credit risk is retained by commercial banks (and partially by FNG) and that 
there are no explicit subsidies (though possibly some implicit subsidies through the use of 
Bancoldex official capital and multilateral credit lines), limits the possibilities of high distortions.  
 
  715. Vertical PDP Case Studies 
 
Colombia’s approach to PDPs has been highly sector-specific. This is true in regard to trade 
policies and is also readily evident in a tax system that over the years has been plagued by sector-
specific incentives which have been, along with tariffs, the most important policy instruments 
used by the Colombian government to encourage productive growth. In 2004, the National 
Economic and Social Policy Council (CONPES) calculated that income tax benefits granted to 
specific sectors or activities amounted that year to about 1.41 percent of GDP ($1,520 million).
86 
The legislation resulting in this value is still in place.
87 Table 17 provides a sense of the history 
of income tax rate dispersion across sectors by depicting manufacturing between 1993 and 2007.  
 











Food products 24.7 1.5 26.8 2.4
Tobacco 19.1 6.9 28.9 5.1
Textiles 21.6 4.0 33.2 1.1
Wearing apparel, except footwear 26.8 2.8 29.0 0.8
Leather products 26.8 3.1 32.2 1.8
Footwear except rubber or plastic  25.7 5.6 33.3 1.0
Wood products, except furniture 23.2 3.7 31.4 3.6
Furniture, except metal 30.3 3.0 31.0 5.7
Paper and products 20.3 5.7 17.0 3.5
Printing and publishing 19.5 0.9 29.8 4.3
Industrial chemicals 27.5 1.7 28.2 2.3
Other chemicals 29.1 1.8 29.2 1.9
Miscellaneous petroleum and coal prod 24.6 7.7 32.1 5.6
Pottery, china, earthware 19.9 5.9 17.4 11.7
Other non-metallic mineral products 20.9 2.8 31.4 3.6
Iron and steel 24.3 3.5 29.3 4.7
Nonferrous metals 26.7 2.0 26.0 3.7
Fabricated metal products 27.2 2.2 33.5 1.0
Machinery, no electric 27.7 3.1 32.7 1.9
Transport equipment 25.8 3.5 30.5 6.2
Other industries 27.5 2.2 29.9 1.8





Source: Ministry of Finance (DIAN) and authors’ calculations.  
                                                 
86 Source: CONPES (2004) Policy Document No.3280. 
87 Law 788 of 2002 granted tax incentives for investment including income tax exemptions to water transportation 
services and wind energy and biomass energy generation (over 15 years), hotel services (over 30 years), ecotourism 
(over 20 years), and software (over 10 years), among others. Law 863 of 2003 allowed deduction of fixed assets 
investments from taxable income. 
  72Protectionism dominated the PDP system until 1991, and despite the fact that the country 
went through trade liberalization in the early 1990s and a number of other types of PDPs are in 
place, protectionist practices remain widespread. In manufacturing, high tariff levels were 
maintained until liberalization. Effective tariff rates went from an average of 38 percent over the 
period 1980-89 to 15 percent in the 1990s, and have remained close to that level during the 
present decade, but liberalization was not uniform across sectors and in many cases was partially 
reversed later on through renewed tariff rate hikes. Table 18 shows tariff dispersion across 
manufacturing sectors. 
 













St. Dev, of 
Tariff Rates 
Food products 35.4 15.5 20.8 8.6 18.2 3.7
Beverages 60.0 20.1 18.2 9.1 18.2 2.9
Tobacco 34.2 15.8 16.3 12.0 18.0 3.0
Textiles 59.9 29.6 20.0 7.4 17.9 3.4
Wearing apparel, except footwear 80.0 32.0 22.4 6.7 19.8 0.8
Leather products 41.8 23.8 16.2 9.8 13.3 5.7
Footwear except rubber or plastic  67.8 23.0 22.5 8.0 19.2 1.8
Wood products, except furniture 45.1 18.7 15.8 8.3 13.3 3.8
Furniture, except metal 52.5 14.2 21.2 6.1 18.3 3.6
Paper and products 33.6 12.4 13.9 7.9 12.2 4.9
Printing and publishing 34.7 24.4 15.6 11.6 13.8 8.4
Industrial chemicals 21.8 9.9 7.9 5.6 6.2 3.7
Other chemicals 20.3 15.8 10.0 7.2 8.8 4.8
Petroleum refineries 12.6 7.7 8.3 4.3 8.1 3.3
Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products  21.6 8.4 9.9 5.5 8.1 3.0
Rubber products 39.7 21.3 16.1 7.5 13.8 3.9
Plastic products 57.5 17.6 19.6 6.5 18.3 4.0
Pottery, china, earthware 49.7 23.5 19.4 9.7 16.3 3.5
Glass and products 32.4 11.1 15.2 8.7 12.9 4.6
Other non-metallic mineral products 30.3 9.5 15.3 6.6 13.1 3.5
Iron and steel 21.0 9.1 8.8 5.1 8.4 3.5
Nonferrous metals 20.5 10.6 7.9 4.9 7.0 2.9
Fabricated metal products 39.5 12.9 16.0 7.5 13.9 4.4
Machinery, no electric 23.0 18.4 9.6 6.4 9.2 4.9
Machinery, electric 33.5 20.7 11.5 7.5 10.3 5.6
Transport equipment 36.5 39.2 14.2 12.1 12.4 8.2
Professional and scientific equipment 25.2 13.4 8.5 6.1 7.4 4.3




         Source: DNP, Dirección de Desarrollo Empresarial. 
 
  73Sector-specific incentives have not, however, been explicitly mentioned in public until 
recently, as Colombia has historically maintained the fiction that there is no industrial policy 
targeting incentives to particular sectors. This has resulted in lack of transparency about the way 
benefits are granted, and in substantial capture by economic groups of politicians and other 
actors that participate in the policymaking process. Our hypothesis is that targeted policies in 
Colombia in general have not followed a market failure rationale. Their implicit logic has rather 
been one of defending the rents of particular groups. The pervasiveness of rough and inefficient 
instruments, such as permanent tariffs and income tax exemptions, suggests that this is indeed 
the case and that, in most cases, the cumulative interventions have basically been the result of 
effective lobbying. Moreover, policies meant to be horizontal have rarely been purely horizontal, 
as benefits have concentrated in the same hands over time. To explore these ideas, we will 
review the experience of two manufacturing sectors that over the years have been and remain the 
object of extensive government intervention under different combinations of targeted PDPs: 
Textiles and Wearing Apparel, and Palm Oil. 
In 2008, however, the Colombian government made explicit its interest in promoting 
particular sectors and compiled tentative lists of sectors for targeted policies that fall more under 
this type of rationale. Software falls in this category and has already participated in the design of 
a Business Plan, the recently introduced policy instrument through which the government intends 
to bring together the efforts of all relevant government institutions and the private sector to 
facilitate the sector’s development. We will use this case to explore to what extent the more 
recent sector-specific policies indeed follow a different logic than earlier PDPs. 
We intend to connect policies and policy instruments to their underlying rationality, to 
identify if there are market failures particular to the sectors under review and to establish 
whether the targeted policies in place have chosen the right instruments, have an adequate design 
and have been useful to address them. We also establish their connection with the productive 
activity of each of these sectors by considering them against the observed sector dynamics. 
 
  745.1  Textiles and Apparel 
 
5.1.1  Sector Performance 
 
The ISIC 2-digit Textiles and Apparel sector represents 6 percent of Colombian manufacturing 
in terms of output and 19 percent in terms of employment. Figures 20 and 21 show the sector’s 
dynamics since 1977 in terms of these variables. Figure 20 shows a good growth rhythm in the 
1980s and early 1990s, followed by negative average growth rate between 1993 and 2002, and 
then recovery at a good pace until 2006, following the overall economy cycles. The picture is 
quite different, however, when the Textiles and Apparel sub-sectors are considered separately. 
While the Textiles subsector has contracted over time, Apparel has grown steadily since 1999. 
As a share of total manufacturing output, however, the sector has been falling since 1992. The 
sector’s share of employment is more stable, but despite two small recovery episodes, 
employment shows a negative trend after 1993, explained wholly by the shrinking of the Textiles 
sub-sector. The jump in 1992 in Figure 21, while more noticeable in the employment series, is 
common to all variables from DANE’s Annual Manufacturing Survey and is due to 
methodological changes introduced into the survey in that year. 
 

































































































































































Textiles Wearing apparel % of total manufacturing
 
Source: DANE, Annual Manufacturing Survey. 


































































































































































Textiles Wearing apparel % of total manufacturing 
 
              Source: DANE, Annual Manufacturing Survey. 
 
Figure 22 shows that the Textiles sub-sector’s decreasing trend is explained by 
substantial exit of productive units between 1998 and 2002, and little or no net entry after that 
year. The remaining plants are somewhat larger than before both in output and employment (see 
Figures 23 and 24). The Apparel sub-sector likewise shows no net entry of plants and an even 
more marked trend towards larger plants. 































































































































































Textiles Wearing apparel % of total manufacturing
 
Source: DANE, Annual Manufacturing Survey. 
 
 























































































































































Source: DANE, Annual Manufacturing Survey. 
























































































































































Source: DANE, Annual Manufacturing Survey. 
 
The positive growth performance of wearing apparel is easily associated with its exports 
dynamics. Apparel exports grew at a good pace between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, then 
slowed down and seem to have picked up a good growth rhythm since 2002. As a share of total 
manufacturing exports, however, Textile and Apparel exports fell steadily in the 1990s and again 
started falling after 2004 (see Figure 25). 
 


































































































































  78Finally, while with regards to labor productivity growth the Textiles and Apparel sector 
has underperformed relative to the average of manufacturing (see Figure 26), it has performed 
notably better with respect to growth in total factor productivity (TFP), as shown in Figure 27. 
Annual average TFP growth for the whole period is about 2.4 percent. This is not impressive, 
however, if productivity is to be the engine of economic growth.  
 













































































































Textiles  Total Manufacturing  
                                   Source: DANE, Annual Manufacturing Survey. 
 
 













































































































                                       Source: Meléndez and Seim (2006). 
  795.1.2  Use of Policy Instruments 
 
Can this sector’s performance be in any way tracked back to the many PDPs it has been exposed 
to throughout the years? In this section we characterize the ways and extent to which the textiles 
sector has taken advantage of government aid, using the Fedesarrollo EOS module
88 and other 
sources of available data. 
Table 19 shows the proportion of firms that report to have used each policy instrument 
available. We have grouped instruments or programs by broad categories, depending on their 
guiding policy objectives. We find a higher share of firms reporting use of most instruments 
since 2000. While there is a potential bias from a better recollection of the recent years, there 
seems to be an undeniable increasing trend in firm participation, probably triggered by a more 
proactive government in this last period.  
Before 1990, export promotion policies were the more widely used. Arbeláez, Meléndez 
and León (2007) report that when asked about the role played by the government, exporting 
firms in the wearing apparel business stated there are two areas of policy in which the action of 
the government is recognized by the industry to have facilitated export activities: policies 
contributing to lowering the final price of the export products in the foreign markets, which has 
improved their ability to compete, and policies that contribute to meeting potential demand in 
foreign markets. 
In the first category, preferential trade agreements appear to have played an important 
role in facilitating the competitiveness of the industry’s products in foreign markets. The textile 
and apparel sector as a whole has been affected by i) the reorientation of the Andean Group 
(Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia and Peru) towards a more open-doors integration model 
(1989-1993) that brought about the adoption of a common external tariff system by 1995; ii) the 
signing of the G3 trade agreement with Venezuela and Mexico (1994) to further the rapid 
insertion of the Colombian economy into the international markets; and most importantly iii) the 
signing of the Andean Trade Preference Agreement  (ATPA,1991) and later of the Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA, 2002), unilateral tariff preference agreements 
with the United States. Forty-five percent of firms report having used one or more of these 
agreements in the present decade. 
 
                                                 
88 An update of the Fedesarrollo EOS figures for the Textiles sector is pending at the time of writing.  










IFI credit lines 15 25 5
Bancoldex credit lines 20 25 80
Finagro, Caja Agraria o Banco Agrario credit lines 15 15 20
Collateral obtained through Fondo de Garant’as 055
Export insurance or other insurance with government support 10 15 25
Exchange-rate hedging with government support 10 10 25
Export promotion instruments
Cat or Cert. 20 25 25
Free export zones 20 30 35
Plan Vallejo 20 25 50
Market information 15 20 45
Fairs and events 15 20 55
Contact with potential clients 20 30 50
ATPA, ATPDEA or other special tariff agreement 20 25 45
Protection from foreign competition
Tariff protection 20 20 45
Other form of protection 000
Technological Innovation
Colciencias funds for technological innovation 15 15 15
Support from Corpoica or Fondos Parafiscales 15 15 20
Incubator program or similar 10 10 15
Tax incentives and/or subsidies
Income tax exemption or deduction 20 20 50
VAT tax exemption or reduction 20 25 50
Direct subsidy 10 10 10
Training
Basic training through SENA 15 20 55
Specific training through SENA 15 20 45
Training through other government owned institute 15 15 15
Training through private institute 15 15 20
Training within the firm 20 20 40
Other
Quality certification program 15 20 30
Phitosanitary certification program 10 15 20
Red tape reduction program 15 20 40  
Source: Fedesarrollo, EOS, October 2008, PDP Module. 
 
In the same category, Plan Vallejo, a program under which local industry is allowed to 
bypass tariffs when importing inputs to be used in the production of exports, has also contributed 
to lower export costs. In practice Plan Vallejo not only affects the prices paid for imported 
inputs, but also those of local competitors selling to exporters. While such a program is 
unnecessary under an open market regime, it has remained useful to the industry as the local 
market for inputs continues to be protected. 20 to 25 percent of firms report having used it before 
2000, and the share seems to have increased in more recent years. 
In the second category, policies that contribute to meeting potential demand in foreign 
markets, Proexport has in recent years played a proactive role as trade facilitator through its 
international offices. In particular it has facilitated the interaction of potential buyers (department 
stores, specialty stores and others) with the potential sellers, often represented by the country’s 
  81larger apparel firms. While this is still an incipient effort on the government’s part, it is 
immensely valued by the industry and has apparently proved useful in terms of materializing 
new business opportunities, particularly in the U.S. market (Arbeláez, Meléndez and León,   
2007). Since 2000, 45 percent of firms report having benefited from market information and 55 
percent report having participated in fairs. 
Bancoldex credit (to exportersonly until 1991 and to all producers after its merger with 
IFI) also reportedly reached 25 percent of all textile firms before 2000. The proportion has since 
risen to 80 percent. Figure 28 shows the evolution of Bancoldex Credit to the Textiles and 
Apparel sector since 1995. With the exception of 2006, when Textiles and Apparel accounted for 
6 percent of all Bancoldex credit, financing from Bancoldex was more important prior to 2000. 
Since 2000, moreover, that financing gone primarily to the shrinking Textiles sub-sector.  
Textiles and Apparel continues to receive a major share of CERTs, a tax subsidy to 
exporters, which has been set at different rates on exports for selected sectors. The amount 
received, however, is much smaller than in the past, as shown in Figure 29). 
 






















































































Textiles Wearing apparel % of total manufacturing
 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade and authors’ calculations.  
  82The proportion of firms who report having used or benefited from tariff protection is also 
increasing over time, from 20 percent to 45 percent before and after 2000, respectively. This 
pattern of response probably comports with a perception of higher foreign competition in a 
context of increasing globalization in recent years, despite lower tariff protection. Figures 29 and 
30 show the nominal and effective tariff rates over time. 
 






































Textiles Wearing apparel % of manufacturing 
 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade and authors’ calculations.  
 
While tariff protection is much lower nowadays than it was in the 1980s, Textiles and 
Apparel remains protected above average manufacturing. The nominal tariffs shown in Figure 30 
are around 20 percent, but effective protection is much higher (see Figure 31). In contrast, only 
15 to 20 percent of firms report having benefited from the policy instruments in the 
Technological Innovation category. 








































































































Textiles Wearing apparel Manufacturing
 
              Source: DNP, Dirección de Desarrollo Empresarial. 
 



















































































Source: DNP and calculations by Rodrigo Moreira, Dirección de Desarrollo Empresarial. 
  84With respect to tax incentives, the high proportion of firms that allegedly have benefited 
from this type of instruments after 2000 probably reflects the use of the tax reduction “for 
investment in fixed assets” introduced in 2004. Figure 32 shows the breaking point this measure 
introduced to the effective income tax rate that is obtained after multiplying the nominal income 
tax rate by the discount factor resulting from accounting for all exemptions and deductions.
89 In 
this context it should be noted that the nominal income tax rate in 2004 was 38.5 percent. 
 








1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Wearing apparel Textiles Manufacturing
 
                           Source: DIAN and authors’ calculations. .  
 
Since 1998 Apparel has had a much lower effective income tax rate than Textiles, with 
more deductions and exemptions. The former sub-sector is systematically below the 
manufacturing average on this account over the whole period, while the former is above. In 
value, however, tax deductions and exemptions to Textiles and Apparel peaked in 1998 and have 
since then been falling, despite increasing effective tax rates; the initial decline coincides with 
the recession of 1999. In 2004, those deduction and exemptions recover, reaching a value of 
more than twice the previous year, which is later sustained; this is the effect of the so-called 
                                                 
89 Using the nominal tax rate we calculated the tax amount payable by each 3-digit ISIC after eliminating all tax 
deductions and exemptions. The discount factor if the ratio of this calculated tax and the actually paid. 
  85investment deduction. Figure 33 shows that the Textiles sub-sector has taken greater advantage 
of this opportunity and has by several times multiplied its tax deductions from previous years. 
Finally, firms report increasing use of general and specific training through SENA and of 
programs related to quality and control certification. They also report being increasingly affected 
over time by red tape reduction efforts. Table 20 presents a summary of the dynamics of both 
performance and policy use over time.  
 










































Textiles Wearing apparel % of total manufacturing 
 
Source: DIAN and authors’ calculations.   
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1980-1990 0.9 -2.9 0.5 3.7 1.1 -2.7 5.4 3.9 - - -14.8 -14.8 - -
1990-1995 2.4 5.1 16.2 -2.8 2.7 5.4 -4.8 -2.6 2.6 -9.1 0.2 -1.4 - -11.3
1995-2000 -1.5 -2.9 -3.1 -1.0 0.9 -0.5 11.0 1.4 11.5 -21.8 0.0 0.6 42.9 -4.9
2000-2006 -6.3 -9.1 7.2 -5.1 2.1 -1.0 - 3.1 -0.1 -2.7 0.0 - -39.3 -46.9
Wearing Apparel
1980-1990 2.0 -0.4 14.7 4.3 0.0 -2.2 5.4 2.3 - - -16.0 -4.4 - -
1990-1995 8.6 8.9 3.1 -1.7 10.1 10.5 -4.8 -0.3 3.9 -5.8 0.0 -11.4 - -4.4
1995-2000 4.7 -3.2 -0.7 4.7 8.5 0.3 11.0 8.2 2.0 4.7 0.0 -22.2 -25.0 -11.4
2000-2006 7.2 4.4 9.3 2.7 7.1 4.4 - 2.6 0.7 -12.8 -0.3 - -29.7 -22.2
Total Manufacturing
1980-1990 4.0 -0.4 4.2 5.2 3.2 -1.2 1.5 4.4 - - -12.7 -9.2 - -
1990-1995 6.9 6.2 7.7 2.8 4.7 4.0 -0.2 0.6 -0.9 13.7 0.3 -1.7 - -12.6
1995-2000 0.6 -4.2 6.6 3.2 2.6 -2.4 10.0 5.1 4.2 -12.2 0.0 0.4 -5.5 1.9
2000-2006 6.8 1.8 7.4 6.7 5.0 0.1 - 4.9 -0.6 13.0 1.4 - -18.7 -35.2  
Source: DANE, Ministry of Industry and Trade, DIAN, DNP and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
  875.1.3  Conclusions 
If PDP design is to be evaluated based on there being a good match between reported market 
failures and policy instruments made available, then both general and specific training programs, 
as well as red tape reduction programs and financial instruments designed to reduce firms’ 
financing costs, can be considered good policies. These are policies that can be tailored to 
particular sector-level needs, but which are in principle of horizontal character. Just as well, a 
request for lower taxes should be understood as a request for a horizontal policy and not for 
differential tax benefits. 
The point to make here is that firms in the Textile and Apparel sector appear to be 
requesting horizontal policies as a response to the problems they face, which are often 
government failures transversal to all productive sectors. Sector-specific policies in the form of 
tax reductions or exemptions or import tariffs are thus bad policies to the extent they are not 
designed to solve the problems allegedly limiting investment. And they are also bad or useless 
costly policies when considered against firm performance. The Textiles sub-sector produced 
399.3 thousand dollars more in output in 2006 than in 2002. During the same period it recovered 
6185.7 thousand dollars in tax reductions and exemptions. This occurred while the Apparel sub-
sector experienced substantial growth under higher income tax rates. 
The Textile and Apparel sector experienced the higher average TFP growth after the 
recession of 1999, when a number of inefficient plants exited the industry. The review of this 
experience of permanent targeted government interventions in different shapes raises the concern 
of whether some low-productivity firms –particularly in the Textile sub-sector– have been keep 
artificially active, with a resulting detrimental effect on aggregate productivity, when in absence 
of these policies they would have closed operations. 
 
5.2 Palm Oil 
 
5.2.1  Sector Performance 
 
Palm oil comes from the kernel and fruit of the African oil palm. In its crude form and in its 
“simple” refined form, palm oil is a commodity. Oils and fat with specific characteristics as well 
as biofuels can be obtained by further refinement, hydrogenation and mixtures, and sold in the 
market as differentiated products with value added. The oil palm itself is a perennial plant that 
  88takes around two years to start production and another five years to reach its peak, remaining 
productive for over 50 years. 
As shown in Figure 34, the total planted area of oil palm has grown steadily over time. 
Growth was particularly high, however, during the second half of the 1980s, when the planted 
area more than doubled. By 2006 oil palm plantations occupied more than 250 thousand acres, 
representing about 8 percent of all permanently cultivated land in Colombia. Subsequent output 
increases were accompanied by substantial productivity growth between 1992 and 2004. In 
recent years, however, yield per acre has deteriorated. 
  




















































































































Palm Oil % of permanent crops planted area
 
 










































































































  Source: Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
 
The increase in oil palm cultivation was accompanied by substantial entry of extraction 
plants, which rose from two in 1983 to 26 in 2001,
90 with a noteworthy jump in the number of 
extraction plants in 1990. The pattern of refinery plants is quite different, with much less 
fluctuation and a decreasing tendency since 1994. 
In terms of money value, the story of output growth is less appealing. The impressive 
growth rates shown above, in particular, do not reflect in the value of refinery activities, which 
follow a different dynamic. Employment in palm oil production has also been falling since 1995 
(see Figure 35). 
                                                 
90 Changes from ISIC Revision 2 to ISIC Revision 3 coding in the Annual Manufacturing Survey in 2002 prevent 
the series from this source from being updated.  
















































































































































































  Source: DANE, Annual Manufacturing Survey. 
 
  91Finally, Figure 36 shows palm oil export dynamics since 1990. Exports took off only in 
1994 and grew steadily until 1999, when they started to fall. Deterioration during the following 
years was, however, followed by recovery at even higher rates than in the previous period of 
positive growth and peaked in 2004. Exports again declined in 2005 and 2006.  
 











































































































5.2.2 Use of Policy Instruments 
Oil palm was introduced in Colombia in 1932, but its commercial expansion started only 20 
years later as a result of government measures to promote economic growth based on import 
substitution. Under a government program to encourage oil crops, plantations were started in the 
Caribbean coastal plain, the Middle Magdalena Valley, the foothills of the Eastern Plains (Llanos 
Orientales) and the Southwest.  The planted area tripled in the 1980s and palm oil became an 
important raw material in the productive chain of oilseeds, oils, and fats. 
The government first promoted Oil Palm production in 1957 through an extension to oil 
palm of the Obligatory Absorption Law that subjected cotton imports to the clearance of local 
production in the market (Decree 290 of 1957). This regulation not only forced national 
  92producers of oils and fats to buy all domestic oleaginous production in order to gain access to 
import licenses, but also granted special tax treatments to private investments in delayed yield 
crops. Almost simultaneously, Law 26 of 1959 determined that all commercial banks had to 
assign 15 percent of their deposits to the promotion of agriculture, livestock and fishing, and 
special credit lines were created for delayed-yield crops, from which the sector greatly benefited.  
The measures described above were complemented by a plan of private/public joint 
ventures promoted by the government for plantations of 5 million square meters, and by 
technical support and seed distribution for smaller crops, often as part of a process of “directed 
colonization” by which lands were offered in exchange for entering oil palm agriculture in 
specific areas. The government implemented a diffusion campaign through written press and 
agricultural fairs, while simultaneously persuading experienced oil and fat producers to assemble 
extraction plants in the plantation areas that later proved vital for the success of Oil Palm 
plantations. In addition, research to foster oleaginous production in Colombia led to the planting 
of 100-150 mother-trees in order to supply high-value seeds. As is evident, the government 
actively participated in fostering the sector’s development. 
In 1963 several funds were created to handle resources destined to finance agricultural 
and industrial activities, the first of which was the Private Investments Fund (known by its 
Spanish acronym FIP). Of $87 million dollars provided to the FIP by the Inter-American 
Development Agency, $15 million was used to promote new oil palm plantations.  Small farmers 
also had access to credit through Caja Agraria, the government-owned rural bank.  
During the late 1960s and the 1970s, however, a change in the national development 
strategy towards export promotion, in combination with plant diseases and competition from 
other oil sources, slowed palm oil production. At the same time competition served to discipline 
producers and generate productivity gains through genetic progress, as well as foster 
cooperation. 
In the 1980s, internal prices rose, taxes were reduced and financial support was increased, 
allowing producers to capitalize on their experience. Even though all efforts to stimulate 
production were directed towards developing the internal market to reduce Colombian 
dependency on foreign supply of oils, the boom of the 1980s resulted in excess production in the 
1990s and led to exports.  
  93Trade liberalization undertaken in the 1990s led to efforts to compensate for losses from 
higher exposure to foreign competition. In particular, various financial mechanisms to support 
agricultural products were put in place, from which oil palm greatly benefited. Figure 37 shows 
how Finagro’s investment and human capital credit lines for this product have increased in value, 
especially since 1999. As a percentage of total credits, Finagro’s oil palm financing peaked in 
2002 at almost 25 percent of its credit. Oil palm thereafter became less important but remained 
significant, accounting for 18 percent of credits in 2006.  
 










































Oil Palm % of total
 
 
Source: 2006 Agricultural Statistical Yearbook and authors’ calculations.   
 
 
Several forms of government intervention have accompanied the observed growth of 
palm oil exports. Besides the support of local production described above, there are two policy 
areas that have proved critical for the sector’s performance: i) the adoption, in the context of 
trade liberalization in the 1990s, of a band-tariff system for a set of agricultural products 
including oil palm, and ii) the creation of a price stabilization fund to protect palm oil production 
and exports from international price fluctuations. These instruments were put in place in 1994 
and 1996, respectively. 
  94The band tariff system is a protection system by which variable tariff rates adjust as 
required to keep domestic prices within a reference price band. Prices are monitored constantly, 
and the floor and ceiling of the band are reviewed every six months. Table 21 shows the resulting 
average tariff rates under this system for the period 1996-2004. The nominal tariff rate to which 
these may be compared is 20 percent. Figure 38 shows effective tariffs for Palm Oil computed 
from nominal tariffs, before the band system is activated.  
 
Table 21. Tariff Rates for Selected Agricultural Sectors 1996-2004 
under the Band-Tariff System 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Wheat 5.2 19.1 43.1 48.0 34.0 22.4 13.1 10.6 4.5
Barley 8.8 16.8 39.0 37.9 28.6 16.8 14.8 8.2 9.9
Yellow corn 8.1 27.3 48.0 65.3 70.2 50.9 26.5 14.8 6.4
White corn 4.4 19.9 32.6 49.3 67.5 35.5 16.8 6.9 6.9
Rice 17.0 21.5 21.1 45.6 69.7 79.8 49.3 32.2 19.8
Sorghum 8.1 27.3 48.0 65.3 70.2 50.9 26.5 14.8 6.4
Soybeans 3.7 6.0 24.8 56.1 39.6 38.5 25.4 10.8 0.2
Peanuts 3.7 6.0 24.8 56.1 39.6 38.5 25.4 10.8 0.2
Brown sugar 3.7 6.0 24.8 56.1 39.6 38.5 25.4 10.8 0.2
White sugar 22.4 25.2 55.6 106.9 72.0 41.2 68.8 43.2 42.7
Palm Oil 18.0 19.0 8.0 52.0 42.0 40.0 29.0 20.0 15.0
Average tariff rates under band tariff system (%) Crop
 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture. 
 









































































































Source: DNP and calculations by Rodrigo Moreira, Dirección de Desarrollo Empresarial. 
  95The Palm Oil price stabilization fund has its origin in Law 101 of 1993, which 
established the creation of price stabilization funds for agricultural, farming and fishery products, 
as special accounts designed to “ensure a fair income to producers, regulate national production 
and increase exports, by financing the stabilization of prices to producers.” The Palm Oil price 
stabilization fund was organized under these dispositions by Decree 2354 of 1996, as part of the 
Fund for Palm Promotion (Fondo de Fomento Palmero), which was created in 1994.  
Notwithstanding all of the above, palm oil is also subject to preferential treatment 
through taxation. Figure 39 shows the effective income tax rate, calculated as described above, 
for the 4-digit ISIC Vegetable and Animal Oils and Fats, to which palm oil belongs.  
 










































































Animal and vegetable oils Manufacturing
 
Source: Ministry of Finance (DIAN) and authors’ calculations.  
 
 
  96Figure 40 shows that since 2000, income tax reductions and exemptions to the Vegetable 
and Animal Oils and Fats sector have amounted to more than US$60 million (in 2007 terms) per 
year. 
 





































































































Animal and Vegetable Oils  % of total manufacturing
 
Source: Ministry of Finance (DIAN) and authors’ calculations.  
 
The drop in the effective income tax rate in 2004, as well as the magnitude of tax benefits 
since that year, probably results from the combination of the 40 percent reduction for investment 
in fixed assets mentioned above, the 10 percent reduction of the taxable database for new 
investments in reforestation, and the income tax exemption to new plantations during 2003-2013, 
which was intended to promote biodiesel production. 
Incentives for biodiesel production also include VAT tax exemptions and the mandate 
that vehicles in cities with a population of more than 500,000 must use a mix of gasoline with 10 
percent biofuels. 
Other policies of more transversal character, but particularly relevant for the palm oil 
sector in light of biodiesel production, are tariff exemptions on inputs used in exports production 
through Plan Vallejo, tariff exemptions for machinery imports, and Free Trade Zone regulations 
for agroindustrial projects (including biodiesel). According to those regulations, investments of 
  97US$ 16.4 million or above, or those creating 500 jobs, will benefit from a 15 percent income tax 
rate (compared to the current nominal tax rate of 33 percent in 2008), regardless of whether they 
are physically located within the Free Trade Zone.  
We do have evidence for use of CERTs by palm oil exporters (see Figure 41). These 
subsidies peaked for the sector in 2000, when they represented about 2.3 percent of all CERTs 
granted, and have been falling both in value and as a share of total CERTs since then.  Table 22 
presents a summary of the dynamics of both performance and the record available of policy use 
over time. 







































Palm oil % of total manufacturing
 
 
               Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade. 
  98Table 22. Average Change Rates (%) 
 
  1980-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2006
Output 8.3 -1.4 -1.5 -
Employment 10.5 3.5 -4.5 -
Exports (in USD) - 65.4 25.4 19.6
Number of plants 10.7 -3.3 -0.4 -
Plant size by output -3.9 -2.7 2.1 -
Plant size by number of employees -1.9 2.1 -1.0 -
Cropland area - 7.9 2.4 9.9
Yield by acre - 4.6 0.6 -1.6
Labor productivity -2.0 -4.7 3.2 -
Effective income tax rate** - -3.4 5.4 -22.1
Tax reductions and exemptions in value** - 18.4 -4.0 73.1
Tariff rate 8.9 -15.2 0.2 0.3
Effective tariff rate 7.1 -1.1 0.2 -
Finagro credit 8.1 23.5
CERTs - 21.1 99.7 -57.1  
Source: DANE, Ministry Agriculture, Ministry of Industry and Trade, DIAN, DNP and calculations 
by the authors. **For 4-digit ISIC code Animal and Vegetable Oils. 
 
5.2.3  Conclusions 
Palm Oil has been object of a number of targeted policies over the years. It seems subsequent 
governments have implicitly agreed that its development is of strategic importance for Colombia. 
Another possible explanation is a sector lobby’s success in having its policy requests fulfilled.  
Regretfully, the picture is one of pervasive protectionism and preferential treatments that 
are hard to justify on grounds of market failures. Interestingly, however, distortions introduced 
by policy interventions have resulted in significant sector expansion and successful export 
activity. Colombia is presently South America’s largest palm oil producer and the world’s fifth-
largest palm oil exporter.   
The story of export success has its origins in tariff protection and price stabilization, but 
for unexpected reasons: artificially high prices in the domestic market apparently created excess 
domestic supply and allowed entry into the world markets of producers that otherwise would 
have been unable to compete. Some who took advantage of this opportunity and made 
substantial investments affirm that they would be able to compete in international markets 
without government support.
91 But many have survived both as producers and exporters as a 
result of government largesse without being efficient enough. 
                                                 
91 From interview with Carlos Antonio Espinosa, one of the largest palm oil producers in Colombia. 
  99In order to explain why poorly designed PDPs have in this case had relative success in 
promoting growth and development, we venture the following hypothesis on the main restriction 
on investment: palm oil production is affected by substantial coordination failures due to both 
large-scale economies at processing plants, which require either huge investments in oil palm 
production (vertical integration) or coordination with a number of smaller oil palm plantations 
located within a particular distance range to operate at cost-efficient levels. This latter option 
involves contracts to guarantee recovery of huge long-term investments. Price differentials and 
other targeted PDPs, however, have facilitated investments in scale and allowed producers to 
largely bypass coordination needs. If this is the case, the correct question to pose is whether 
alternative policies could have achieved similar results at lower costs.  
Can this be a case of successful infant industry protection? Even if this was the case in 
the beginning, the extremely generous tax incentives of recent years, when the industry was 
already mature and a consolidated exporter, cannot be justified on those grounds. Those 
incentives instead seem to be the consequence of a traditional rent-seeking process, taking 
advantage of the new priority given to rural public security to which employment in palm oil can 
allegedly contribute. Such incentives might have had some effect on increases in planted area 
and production, but not on employment, yields or exports, all of which actually fell in this 
period. 
Finally, the appearance of biofuels is good news for the industry. This possibility, which 
was not foreseen when the governments initially decided to favor the palm oil industry, may well 
result in a better cost-benefit evaluation of the PDPs examined in the future. 
 
5.3  Software and Information Technologies (IT) 
 
5.3.1  Sector Performance 
 
Despite having been identified almost a decade ago for its growth potential, its potential 
spillovers to other productive sectors, and, through them, for its key role as motor for aggregate 
productivity growth, the Colombian Software and IT sector remains relatively small and 
concentrated in the domestic market (only 10 percent of income comes from export activities
92). 
                                                 
92 Source: Software and IT Business Plan, 2008. 
  100According to DANE’s Annual Services Survey (EAS for its acronym in Spanish),
93 however, 
between 2000 and 2005 (the last year for which there is data available), average output growth 
was 6.5 percent per year, a not insignificant rate. Also, there was substantial entry of new firms 
between 2002 and 2004, although this tendency apparently reversed in 2005, and, like output, 
employment followed a sustained growth trend during the period, unaffected by firm turnover 
(see Figure 42). In fact, employment growth was more spectacular than output growth: 
employment went from 10,585 employees to around 20,620 between 2000 and 2005, almost 
doubling, while output went from US$ 403.7 million to US$ 553.8 million for an overall increase 
of 37 percent over the same period. The result in terms of labor productivity performance is 
consequently not appealing.  
Falling labor productivity was accompanied by a trend toward larger firms in terms of 
employment. The trend of firm size in terms of output is also increasing but not as markedly. 
  






























                                                 
93 The DANE EAS is representative for the Software and IT sector until 2005. It samples all legally constituted 
firms with 20 or more employees, and it includes a probabilistic sample of the legally constituted smaller firms 
below that size.   


























































            Source: EAS, DANE and authors’ calculations.  
 
  102Table 23 completes the sector’s picture by looking at performance by firm size measured 
by employment, in the most recent year for which data are available.
94 We find a sector 
composed of a small number of very large firms, of about 1,500 employees on average, that 
account for 21 percent of output and 48 percent of employment, a tier of medium to large firms 
of 143 employees on average, that account for 60 percent of output and 37 percent of 
employment, another tier of small to medium firms of 39 employees on average, that account for 
12 percent of output and 11 percent of employment, and finally a larger group of smaller firms of 
12 employees on average that account for only 7 percent of output and 4 percent of employment. 
 
Table 23. Statistics by Firm Size (Number of Employees), 2005 
USD million % No. % No. %
Total 554 100 192 100 20,620 100 26,857 107
Less than 25 38 7 76 39 899 4 42,223 12
25 to 64 69 12 56 29 2,176 11 31,685 39
65 to 129 103 19 28 15 2,303 11 44,598 82
130 to 209 81 15 13 7 2,006 10 40,208 155
210 to 434 146 26 13 7 3,390 16 43,029 262








Source: EAS, DANE and calculations by the authors. 
 
5.3.2  Use of Policy Instruments 
 
The Software and IT sector is newer than both manufacturing sectors reviewed previously, and 
for that reason government policies explicitly put in place to support it and promote its growth 
date only to the 2000s. We have identified government efforts on three fronts that should have by 
now shown effects on sector performance: 
 
•  Financial support programs: “design and development of new software 
products” has been since the early 2000s among the list of activities/products 
that may access funding through special support programs from at list three 
public institutions: FOMYPIME, Proexport (through Programa Nacional de 
Productividad y Competitividad, PNPC) and Colciencias.  
                                                 
94 Size categories are determined by DANE. 
  103•  Income tax exemptions: in 2002 rents generated by the development of new 
software products were declared exempt of income tax for 10 years by Law 
788 (Article 18). 
•  Competitiveness Agreement: the government signed a Competitiveness 
Agreement with the Software and IT sector in 2000, by which both parts 
committed themselves to actions in the following areas: recognition of the 
Software and IT industry; improvement of telecommunications infrastructure 
according to modern technologies; human resources development; legal 
framework development; adoption of international standards; strengthening of 
firm management; access to risk capital and strengthening of the sector’s 
business association. A set of concrete actions was agreed upon, and there is a 
review record available from the Ministry of Industry and Trade stating that of 
a total of 26 commitments, 14 were complied with, nine were in progress at 
the time of the review, and three had not been addressed at all. Among the 
first group, probably the most relevant in terms of their potential impact are 
those associated with setting quality standards for academic programs in 
engineering (Decree 792 of 2001), facilitating certified training, and creating a 
quality certification program (through SENA and PNPC-Proexport
95). Among 
the second group, the most salient commitment involves intellectual property 
rights protection legislation and enforcement and piracy control. Finally, 
among the commitments not addressed at the time of the review was one from 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade to consolidate a risk capital supply for the 
sector. 
 
Regrettably there is no updated record available of the firms who have directly benefited 
from the policy instruments that are not targeted sector-wide, but instead require self-selection by 
firms, such as certification programs.  
More recently, in 2008 as mentioned above, the Software and IT sector was object of a 
jointly developed Business Plan with the government. This plan offers a diagnostic of the 
Software and IT sector and its potential vis-à-vis international markets, and, in the spirit of the   
                                                 
95 At the time of the review 19 firms had been certified. 
  104previous Competitiveness Agreement, it identifies a set of actions to facilitate the sector’s 
development. The list of restrictions and actions required to overcome them coincides in many 
cases with those included in the Competitiveness Agreement, revealing that even where 
commitments were considered fulfilled, there remains room for improvement. Table 24 
summarizes market failures and identifies interventions to address them.
96 
 
Table 24. Market Failures Identified and Actions Agreed Upon 
 
  Market Failure Horizontal actions Vertical actions
1. Development of inter-institutional 
programs
2. Design of short term bilingual programs
3. Strengthening of bilingual education in 
school
4. Design of financial instruments for 
education 
5. Development of information systems for 
education monitoring
6. Diffusion programs  in education 
institutions
7. Ajustment of regulations affecting the 
industry: customs, trade, exchange rate and 
accounting
8. Monitoring of telecommunication and 
information services regulation
1. Improvement  of tax benefit 
for technological information 
content
9. Promotion of double taxation agreements 
with strategic countries
2. Design of an offset program 
for public purchases
10. Design of  public/private promotion 
funds
11. Design of financial instruments
12. Development of  business associations
13. Development of commercialization 
channels
14. Quality certification  3. Stregthening of individual 
property rights
15. Promotion of foreign investment
4. Support to public programs 
that promote productive 
transformation
16. Design of a private investment fund, 
supported by Bancoldex
17.Promotion of private intervention in 
government programs 
18.Design of technological parks
19. Access to telecommunication channels




development  and lacking 
production capacity
Poor or insufficient 
infrastructure services  
Source: Business Plan IT Services. 
 
 
The terminology of the Software and IT Business Plan resembles that used in the call for 
papers that gives origin to this document. Policy actions are classified as horizontal or vertical, 
and associated with restrictions to investment classified as market failures. However, the 
category  “regulatory inadequacy category” bundles actions that correspond to solving 
government failures (adjustment of existing regulations, monitoring of existing regulations) with 
                                                 
96 Taken directly from the Software and IT Business Plan. 
  105others that are more likely associated with other types of market failures (design of promotion 
funds, design of financial instruments), and other of the problem category labels could probably 
be revised to directly state the information or coordination externalities that the policy action 
agreed upon is expected to address.  
Interestingly, out of 23 necessary interventions identified, 19 are presented in the 
Business Plan as horizontal policy requests, and only four are openly associated with specific 
needs of the Software and IT sector. Some would argue, however, that horizontal policy actions 
often turn out to be very sector specific in practice. This reflection should serve to somewhat 
moderate our conclusions with respect to the desirable degree of transversality of adequately 
designed PDPs. 
 
5.3.3  Conclusions 
 
The Software and IT sector’s development is still recent, but it involves both tracks of 
policymaking described in Section 2. Identified in the early 2000s as a “strategic” sector, it has 
been the object of pervasive tax exemptions and of overlapping funding programs from various 
government institutions.  The sector has at the same time been a pioneer in Competitiveness 
Agreements and Business Plans, the two most recent attempts at a new way of policymaking that 
intends to identify good policies through close interaction with the interested private parties.  
Neither tax exemptions nor the proliferation of wide-ranging funding programs can be 
justified on grounds of the market (or government) failures identified in the 2008 Business Plan, 
nor on their impact on productivity performance. Insufficient human capital, quality standards 
and certification, and intellectual property rights protection adequately conceived and enforced 
are at the root of the problems preventing the Software and IT sector from reaching its full 
potential. These are the “activities” at the root of the coordination failures holding back this 
sector, and for this reason the requests for policies in these categories in Table 24 are well 
justified and would, if implemented, represent good policy. The request for “tax benefit 
improvements” is for the same reason suspect. It is conceptually related to “regulatory 
inadequacy” but does not really address an identified market failure, and comes from a sector 
that is already exempt from income tax on new product development.  
While Business Plans indeed represent a progress in terms of traditional policymaking, in 
particular with regards to the process of eliciting the needs from the private sector, the reflections 
  106in the previous paragraph suggest two concerns about the shape those plans can take in practice. 
The first has to do with the overlap of policies that come out of the joint exercise that gives 
origin to a Business Plan and targeted policies already in place. Business Plans should 
consolidate the full set of policies addressing the particular sector needs but not automatically 
“absorb” policies already in place that do not address the particular needs identified. Thus arise 
concerns regarding political interference in Business Plans and the government’s capacity to 
eliminate all other targeted policies once the Business Plan is in its final shape. 
The second concern involves implementation enforcement. While it is true that Business 
Plans go some steps forward relative to Competitiveness Agreements, there is no guarantee that 
the interventions identified will take place in a given time frame. They also require the 
compliance of more than one government institution and some of the interventions require going 
through Congress. So there is a risk that Business Plans do not materialize or materialize in 
shapes different to those originally conceived. So Business Plans are originated through a 
process that is an example of good policy-making according to the more recent literature, and do 
have merit as potential route maps. But they cannot be automatically qualified as “good policy” 
without revising their contents, which may include “good” and “bad” policies, and it remains to 
see how they translate in actual policies; so the jury is still out. 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
In Colombia, use of sector-specific or region-specific PDPs as well as of more horizontal 
incentive policies has been extensive, despite the fiction maintained until recently of only 
moderate government intervention. With few exceptions, PDPs have rarely been explicitly 
associated with the need to address market failures; this is particularly true for vertical PDPs 
targeting sectors or particular groups of firms. More commonly, PDPs have been connected to 
economic reactivation or “competitiveness,” a term that until recently dominated policymaking 
jargon to justify a mixed set of policies bound together only up by loose rationality. There has 
always been also a set of PDPs that, in the spirit of “second best” policies, address government 
failures deemed to be more difficult to correct by first best interventions. 
However, the shift from protectionism towards a more open economy in the early 1990s 
has led to a change in productive development policies in Colombia. Up to the 1980s, traditional 
“industrial policies,” based on selective trade protectionism, tax incentives and subsidized credit 
  107for “strategic industries,” prevailed. There were no open consultations with the private sector and 
opaque rent-seeking influences were generalized. Since then, however, Colombia has made 
progress in structuring a well-designed institutional setting for PDPs that is sufficiently 
embedded within a network of linkages with private groups to elicit information about the 
constraints and opportunities facing the private sector that require government intervention. This 
has been a process of trial and error that started with liberalization in the early 1990s and that, 
while still lacking in many dimensions, is starting to reflect in some interesting courses of policy 
action. In this setting, at least in theory, the State’s role is seen more as that of a coordinator and 
specific public goods provider rather than of a provider of subsidies and protection. There are 
some quite promising developments, in particular the creation of a Private Competitiveness 
Council that has been accepted by the government as its main counterpart in structuring the 
“competitiveness and productivity” system of participative PDP policy formulation and the joint 
elaboration of “business plans” for selected sectors, through a rigorous process that mixes 
technical scanning with some competition for limited government resources. 
However, several concerns remain. The first relates to the “sustainability” of this process, 
as since the early 1990s every new government (including the transition from Uribe’s first to 
second administration) has substantially changed the institutional structure, process and content 
of policy. The presence of the Private Competitiveness Council might help in increasing 
continuity. A second concern involves implementation. Though some ministries and Government 
agencies (those led by more technocratic ministers and directors) are clearly committed to the 
more modern PDP process and contents, especially to selected “business sector plans,” some key 
ministries and agencies (particularly in agriculture and transport infrastructure) are not bound by 
this process and continue to carry on a more traditional clientelistic and rent-seeking policy 
agenda. More generally, the new institutional setting for PDP design coexists with the traditional 
clientelistic track of policymaking in which economic groups and other private actors obtain 
rents (tax cuts, public subsidies, etc.) by engaging in transactions with the executive branch and 
Congress. As a consequence, the overall set of PDPs in place still lacks coherence and is often 
not guided by a sound open process of organized policy consultation with the private sector. In 
fact, clientelistic practices and rent seeking, and as a consequence tax incentives and subsidies 
that cannot be justified by market failures, have actually increased in intensity in recent years, 
alongside the institutionalization of a parallel modern participatory PDP process. Why this has 
  108happened—and how and whether these parallel tracks will eventually converge—remains an 
open question for fruitful future research.  
These tensions are apparent in the more detailed analysis that we conducted on both 
specific horizontal and vertical interventions. With respect to the former category of horizontal 
interventions, we found that, although there has been significant progress in designing export 
promotion policies to address actual market failures (linked to the process of opening of new 
export lines and markets, as in Proexport services) or government failures (the duty drawback 
system), and to reduce subsidies in export credits (through Bancoldex), there have been some 
important reversals in other aspects. In particular, export subsidies (CERTs) that had been 
previously eliminated, were temporarily restored for some vocal export sectors, allegedly to 
“compensate” for currency appreciation pressures. Worst, in reforming Export Zones to conform 
to WTO agreements, a new regime of highly discretional FTZ advantages for large investments 
was created and is producing major distortions among similar firms. We also found that policies 
to support access to finance for microfirms and SMEs have evolved in a way that relates better to 
potential market failures, while SME credit subsidies have been significantly reduced. On the 
other hand, training policies remain dominated by a virtual monopoly of a public institute 
(SENA) that is generously financed by an earmarked tax on wages yet lacks the ability to adjust 
to changing needs determined by the fast pace of technological progress and a more complex 
economy. Moreover, SENA has successfully resisted several attempts to institute a more 
competitive system of training services. 
In the second category of vertical interventions we analyzed the cases of two mature 
sectors that have been the object of multiple policies over the years (Textiles and Apparel, and 
Palm Oil) and of a younger sector that has been more recently identified as a strategic sector for 
economic growth. In the first two cases we found it is hard to relate benefits in a discernible way 
to market failures, or to productivity increases. In fact, government support seems to have 
allowed the survival of productive units that would have otherwise exited the industry, hurting 
aggregate productivity. In the case of Palm Oil, where coordination failures pose a significant 
restriction on growth, government support appears to have been useful to bypass these failures 
by facilitating production at larger scales. However it did so at a much higher cost than would 
have represented to address the source of the coordination failures directly. Finally, in the case of 
Software the more modern Business Plan approach to develop a competitive sector coexists with 
  109tax incentives and other traditional interventions. The government faces the challenge of 
transitioning to a unified PDP system that is all-encompassing: Business Plans must only absorb 
the policies in place that are justified by the restrictions on productive investment identified by 
the private actors, and not automatically “absorb” policies already in place that do not address 
the particular needs identified. Thus there remains concern regarding political interference in 
Business Plans and the government’s ability to eliminate all other targeted policies once a 
Business Plan is in its final form.   
We close with two final reflections. The first is that, while vertical policies targeting the 
origin of coordination failures affecting particular sectors can be justified on a case-by-case 
basis, Colombia must continue its efforts to provide a basic set of horizontal public goods that 
are productivity enhancing to all private actors: improved basic education, adequate 
infrastructure services, further red tape reduction, advances in quality control and certification, 
and a working competition policy. These policy areas have a central place among policy requests 
by the private sector, and their provision has the potential of multiplying the impact on 
productivity of all other policy efforts. 
The second and final remark is that efforts towards “good” policymaking must be 
complemented with an additional effort to reach firms and sectors that, while not traditionally 
participants in consultation processes, may contribute significantly to aggregate productivity 
once the information and/or coordination failures facing them are solved. So far, efforts to bring 
the private sector closer to the policymaking process have been to a large extent restricted to 
larger actors.  
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 Appendix 1 
 
1.  Domestic Agenda for Productivity and Competitiveness 
 
The National Planning Department keeps a case-by-case record of the policy requests 
formulated during the Domestic Agenda discussion tables in 2004, and of the 
government’s subsequent responses reactions to those requests. This record was made 
available to the research team for the purpose of this study.  
In order to use this information, it was necessary to convert it into a workable 
database by assigning codes to text entries. This included coding sectors and regions and 
also classifying both policy requests and justifications offered in broad categories. 
The database consists of 4,079 sector-region entries comprising 25 ISIC 3-digit 
sectors and 31 departments (geopolitical regions akin to states or provinces). 
 
Figure A1 1. Perceived Problems 
 
  Market Failure Horizontal actions Vertical actions
1. Development of inter-institutional 
programs
2. Design of short term bilingual programs
3. Strengthening of bilingual education in 
school
4. Design of financial instruments for 
education 
5. Development of information systems for 
education monitoring
6. Diffusion programs  in education 
institutions
7. Ajustment of regulations affecting the 
industry: customs, trade, exchange rate and 
accounting
8. Monitoring of telecommunication and 
information services regulation
1. Improvement  of tax benefit 
for technological information 
content
9. Promotion of double taxation agreements 
with strategic countries
2. Design of an offset program 
for public purchases
10. Design of  public/private promotion 
funds
11. Design of financial instruments
12. Development of  business associations
13. Development of commercialization 
channels
14. Quality certification  3. Stregthening of individual 
property rights
15. Promotion of foreign investment
4. Support to public programs 
that promote productive 
transformation
16. Design of a private investment fund, 
supported by Bancoldex
17.Promotion of private intervention in 
government programs 
18.Design of technological parks
19. Access to telecommunication channels




development  and lacking 
production capacity
Poor or insufficient 
infrastructure services  
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Enhancement of agricultural areas
Strengthening of urban planning
Reduction of import tariffs
English as a second language
Improvement of National security 
Strengthening of entrepreneurship
Enhancement of  installed capacity
Improvement of logistics capacity
Improvement of competition policy
Development of clean production strategies
Red tape reduction
Support to research groups 
Development of marketing strategies
Development of information systems
Improvement of  infrastructure services
Development of inter-institutional programs
Improvement of transport infrastructure
Specialized education 
Quality certification 
Improvement of basic education
Design of financial instruments and incentives
Technological programs
Development of commercialization channels
Strengthening of cooperation strategies
Strengthening of institutions
 
Source: DNP Domestic Agenda database and calculations from the author. 
 
2.  Fedesarrollo’s Entrepreneurial Opinion Survey (EOS) 
 
Fedesarrollo’s Entrepreneurial Opinion Survey (EOS) is a monthly survey representative 
for the manufacturing sector at the national level. It is sampled to provide robust results 
for two types of segmentations: (1) by size (large versus medium and small firms) and (2) 
by international exposure (exporters versus non-exporters).  
In addition to the basic questionnaire, the October 2008 EOS included a thematic 
module on Productive Development Polices (PDPs) designed for the purpose of this 
study, to which 202 manufacturing firms responded. 
The assessment of perceived problems obtained by means of the PDP module 
presents a slightly different picture about the most frequent concerns of the private sector 
than the records from the Domestic Agenda. Three factors may explain the differences: i) 
the EOS is representative of the manufacturing sector while the Domestic Agenda was 
  118wider in terms of sector reach but targeted only those sectors interested in participating in 
the policymaking process; ii) the EOS reaches entrepreneurs and not sector 
representatives; and iii) the EOS reaches entrepreneurs that may not participate at all in 
policymaking, while interaction within the Domestic Agenda by definition occurred with 
those who participate. 
 
Table A2 1. Use of Policy Instruments 
(percentage of total firms responding each period)* 
 







IFI credit lines 45 44 12
Bancoldex credit lines 48 54 64
Finagro, Caja Agraria o Banco Agrario credit lines 35 33 29
Collateral obtained through Fondo de Garant’as 25 26 23
Export insurance or other insurance with government support 31 30 30
Exchange-rate hedging with government support 25 23 26
Export promotion instruments
Cat or Cert. 46 54 45
Free export zones 31 36 35
Plan Vallejo 48 53 52
Market information 34 38 43
Fairs and events 41 43 48
Contact with potential clients 37 36 41
ATPA, ATPDEA or other special tariff agreement 31 35 36
Protection from foreign competition
Tariff protection 59 59 54
Other form of protection 1 1 2
Technological Innovation
Colciencias funds for technological innovation 42 46 40
Support from Corpoica or Fondos Parafiscales 31 29 26
Incubator program or similar 25 23 20
Tax incentives and/or subsidies
Income tax exemption or deduction 58 59 60
VAT tax exemption or reduction 51 48 54
Direct subsidy 9 10 9
Training
Basic training through SENA 69 68 62
Specific training through SENA 57 56 52
Training through other government owned institute 28 26 23
Training through private institute 37 34 31
Training within the firm 48 45 46
Other
Quality certification program 55 60 62
Phitosanitary certification program 28 29 25
Red tape reduction program 43 43 41  
 
* Percentages were calculated from among firms responding for the period in question, regardless of 
whether they did or did not provide a response for other periods. 
 
  119Table A2 2. Use of Policy Instruments by Size, 2000 to Present 
 
  Policy instrument Large Medium Small
Financial instruments
IFI credit lines 12 13 11
Bancoldex credit lines 59 80 50
Finagro, Caja Agraria o Banco Agrario credit lines 30 35 11
Collateral obtained through Fondo de Garant’as 15 33 50
Export insurance or other insurance with government support 32 35 11
Exchange-rate hedging with government support 22 37 22
Export promotion instruments
Cat or Cert. 55 37 17
Free export zones 40 35 11
Plan Vallejo 67 35 17
Market information 41 52 33
Fairs and events 47 52 44
Contact with potential clients 42 48 22
ATPA, ATPDEA or other special tariff agreement 37 39 28
Protection from foreign competition
Tariff protection 54 65 33
Other form of protection 2 0 6
Technological Innovation
Colciencias funds for technological innovation 40 46 28
Support from Corpoica or Fondos Parafiscales 29 24 17
Incubator program or similar 21 22 11
Tax incentives and/or subsidies
Income tax exemption or deduction 62 70 33
VAT tax exemption or reduction 55 65 22
Direct subsidy 91 50
Training
Basic training through SENA 62 67 50
Specific training through SENA 54 59 33
Training through other government owned institute 24 22 17
Training through private institute 38 20 28
Training within the firm 51 37 44
Other
Quality certification program 64 59 61
Phitosanitary certification program 29 22 17
Red tape reduction program 41 48 28  
 
  120Table A2 3. Percentage of Firms Rating Instrument as Inadequate, 2000 to Present  
(as percentage of firms responding) 
 
  Policy instrument Total Large Medium Small
Financial instruments
IFI credit lines 36 38 38 33
Bancoldex credit lines 50 42 58 43
Finagro, Caja Agraria o Banco Agrario credit lines 49 50 50 33
Collateral obtained through Fondo de Garant’as 34 40 33 20
Export insurance or other insurance with government support 31 32 29 33
Exchange-rate hedging with government support 42 35 50 50
Export promotion instruments
Cat or Cert. 65 68 70 43
Free export zones 36 35 40 0
P l a n  V a l l e j o 3 22 73 63 3
Market information 40 29 48 50
Fairs and events 42 43 41 40
Contact with potential clients 38 31 43 50
ATPA, ATPDEA or other special tariff agreement 37 31 44 33
Protection from foreign competition
Tariff protection 50 58 44 33
Other form of protection 60 50 0 100
Technological Innovation
Colciencias funds for technological innovation 40 36 42 45
Support from Corpoica or Fondos Parafiscales 36 33 40 43
Incubator program or similar 35 33 38 33
Tax incentives and/or subsidies
Income tax exemption or deduction 40 33 49 33
VAT tax exemption or reduction 45 39 51 43
Direct subsidy 48 - 64 0
Training
Basic training through SENA 34 33 35 36
Specific training through SENA 33 36 23 45
Training through other government owned institute 37 36 42 33
Training through private institute 30 30 33 25
Training within the firm 34 36 30 40
Other
Quality certification program 23 21 18 43
Phitosanitary certification program 28 28 25 33
Red tape reduction program 29 27 29 40  
  121Table A2 4. Percentage of Firms Rating Instrument as Inadequate  
(as a percentage of firms reporting use of policy instruments in all periods) 
 





IFI credit lines 17 16 38
Bancoldex credit lines 24 11 16
Finagro, Caja Agraria o Banco Agrario credit lines 27 27 39
Collateral obtained through Fondo de Garant’as 43 36 29
Export insurance or other insurance with government support 69 48 38
Exchange-rate hedging with government support 65 61 54
Export promotion instruments
Cat or Cert. 16 21 56
Free export zones 41 32 23
Plan Vallejo 24 10 9
Market information 53 32 25
Fairs and events 53 36 31
Contact with potential clients 68 47 38
ATPA, ATPDEA or other special tariff agreement 45 26 22
Protection from foreign competition
Tariff protection 25 33 41
Other form of protection 100 100 100
Technological Innovation
Colciencias funds for technological innovation 64 50 49
Support from Corpoica or Fondos Parafiscales 76 69 62
Incubator program or similar 70 61 52
Tax incentives and/or subsidies
Income tax exemption or deduction 48 44 31
VAT tax exemption or reduction 49 42 41
Direct subsidy 75 0 75
Training
Basic training through SENA 38 24 24
Specific training through SENA 45 28 27
Training through other government owned institute 58 54 54
Training through private institute 29 27 18
Training within the firm 27 16 15
Other
Quality certification program 47 22 14
Phitosanitary certification program 54 31 27
Red tape reduction program 70 49 31
 
  122Table A2 5. Most Desired Policies 
(percentage of total firms responding) 
 
  Total Large Medium Small
Tax reduction 17 19 19 13
Lower costs of financing 12 7 13 25
Improvement of infrastructure services 11 12 13
Reduction of payroll taxes 11 7 16 25
Tax rule stability 6 10
Control to smugglers 6 7 13
Tariff reduction (inputs) 6 4 6 13
General support 6 3 13
Protection from imports competition 5 7
Exchange rate stability 5 3 9
Reduction of labor market rigidities 2 3
Better integration agreements 2 3
Red tape reduction 2 1 3
Technological innovation and R&D 2 1 3
Training 2 3 13
Tax incentives for investment 2 3
Policy transparency 2 3
Access to financing 1 3
Fairs 1 1
Incentives for foreign investment 1 1
National security 1 1  
 
  123Table A2 6. Participation in PDP Policymaking 
(percentage of total firms in each category) 
 
 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
30 70 38 63 16 84 29 71
If affirmative:
Participated before 1991
Participated in the 90's
Has participated in the present decade
Participation has been:
Direct, through firm manager or special office
Direct, through a professional lobbyst
Through a business association
Other
Participation in the context of:
Negotiations of Competitiveness Agreements
Discussion of Domestic Agenda





Adequate because the government provides 
sufficient spaces for participation
Only for firms represented by a business 
association
Only for large firms
Only for groups with political power in the 
regions
Not working due to lack of mechanisms to 











































































  124Table A2 7. Participation in PDP Policymaking 







Participated in the 90's
  Permanently
  Sporadically




Direct, through firm manager or special office
Direct, through a professional lobbyst
Through a business association
Other
Participation in the context of:
Negotiations of Competitiveness Agreements
Discussion of Domestic Agenda





Adequate because the government provides 
sufficient spaces for participation
Only for firms represented by a business 
association
Only for large firms
Only for groups with political power in the 
regions
Not working due to lack of mechanisms to 
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Table A2 8. Participation in PDP Policymaking by Channel  
(% over total replies of participating firms in each category) 
 
  Total Large Medium Small
One or more congressmen 60 55 78 67
The President 18 19 11 17
A Minister or Vice-minister 11 10 11 17
Other public officials 7 10 0 0
No response 5 7 0 0  
 
 
Table A2 9. Participation in PDP Policymaking by Channel  
(percentage of total replies of participating firms reaching each channel) 
 
Large Medium Small Total
One or more congressmen 68 21 12 100
The President 80 10 10 100
A Minister or Vice-minister 67 17 17 100




Table A2 10. Participation in PDP Policymaking by Channel  
(percentage of total firms in each category) 
 
  Total Large Medium Small
One or more congressmen 18 21 12 19
The President 5 7 2 5
A Minister or Vice-minister 3 4 2 5
Other public officials 2 4 0 0
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Table A2 11. Interaction Effectiveness by Channel (percentage) 
  
 
Succesful: a similar policy 
was implemented
Moderately succesful: a 
similar policy has some 
times been implemented
Moderately succesful: the 
requested policy was not 
implemented but a 
compensatory policy was 
implemented in its place
Not successful: the policy 
request was denied
One or more congressmen 25 25 25 25
The President 39 50 11 0
A Minister or Vice-minister 20 29 34 17
Other public officials 23 15 15 46
O t h e r  c h a n n e l 3 82 52 51 3  
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